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INTRODUCTION
In April 2018, the United States Supreme Court, in Jesner v. Arab Bank,
PLC, denied terror victims in Israel access to U.S. courts, holding in a 5-to-
4 vote, that foreign corporations may not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS).1 The petitioners alleged that Arab Bank, a Jordanian financial
institution, had facilitated acts of terrorism by maintaining bank accounts for
known jihadists, and that it had used its New York branch to clear
transactions and launder money for a US-based charity said to be affiliated
with Hamas. Faced with the question whether liability under the ATS
extends to foreign corporations, the Court found that there was no
international custom to hold corporations liable for human rights abuses.
The majority argued that the ATS was of jurisdictional nature and courts
regularly could not use it to create new private rights of action.2 This task
should be left to the legislator, especially on issues, which, like the present
case, involved foreign policy concerns.3 Based on its restrictive
interpretation of the ATS, the Court concluded that U.S. courts did not have
jurisdiction over foreign-based Arab Bank.
The decision is said to deal the deathblow to United States human rights
litigation.4 For almost 40 years, plaintiffs from around the world have used
the ATS to bring human rights claims between foreign plaintiffs and
1. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)
(indicating that the ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States”).
2. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1389 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–
14 (2004)) (explaining that in Sosa, the Court held that ATS litigation implicates serious
separation-of-powers and foreign-relations concerns).
3. See id. at 1399 (pointing to “significant diplomatic tensions” the litigation has caused
“with Jordan for more than a decade”).
4. Bastian Brunk, The Supreme Court Deals the Death Blow to US Human Rights
Litigation, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (last visited Sept. 25, 2018), http://conflictoflaws.net/2018
/the-supreme-court-deals-the-death-blow-to-us-human-rights-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/U2
6T-E3FM] (concluding that the Supreme Court “has rendered human rights litigation against
foreign corporations before US courts impossible,” but that the ATS remains “applicable if
the defending corporation has its seat in the territory of the [United States]”).
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defendants before U.S. federal courts.5 For decades, the United States legal
system, with features such as class action lawsuits, discovery, jury trials,
contingency fees, and potentially high damage awards was not only more
attractive to plaintiffs than many other—though arguably closer connected—
foreign forums;6 U.S. courts were sometimes the only available forum for
victims or their heirs to pursue their rights.7 Nevertheless, even human rights
promoting businesses and foreign governments have frequently criticized the
far-reach and scope of U.S. courts’ human rights litigation under the ATS.8
They feel that the long arm of U.S. jurisdiction encroaches on their sovereign
rights.9 Jesner, at the detriment of international human rights victims, could
end the U.S. federal courts’ controversial role as the world’s “human rights
5. Starting with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980), few cases have
been successful to date; however, researchers have found positive spillover effects of even
unsuccessful litigation or settlements on the advancement of human rights protection in the
corporate setting. See generally Judith Schrempf-Stirling & FlorianWettstein, Beyond Guilty
Verdicts: Human Rights Litigation and its Impact on Corporations’ Human Rights Policies,
145 J. BUS. ETHICS 545 (2017) (reviewing the potential of non-judicial side effects of human
rights litigation).
6. See Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98
B.U. L. REV. 397, 418–19 n.125 (2018) (noting that there is empirical evidence that the U.S.
legal environment may be less favorable to plaintiffs “as it supposedly once was, and that
other countries will increasingly draw litigants to their courts through a combination of ex
ante forum selection agreements and ex post forum shopping”) (citing Marcus S. Quintanilla
& Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign
Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 33 (2011)).
7. On the difficulty for plaintiffs to find relief in the host state, see GWYNNE SKINNER,
ROBERT MCCORQUODALE &OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL
REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 24 (2013) (listing
lack of a functioning judicial system, danger of persecution of victims, legal tradition and
culture, and legal costs as the main reasons for why host state litigation is often challenging);
see also infra Part III (showing recent trends in Europe to give human rights victims effective
access to MNCs’ home-state courts).
8. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398 (noting objections to ATS litigation expressed by
multiple foreign governments during theKiobel litigation); see alsoDaimler A.G. v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 141–42 (2014) (internal citation omitted) (holding that the Court was informed
by the Solicitor General “that ‘foreign governments’ objections to some domestic courts’
expansive views of general jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international
agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments’”); seeCaroline Kaeb
& David Scheffer, The Paradox of Kiobel in Europe, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 852, 857 (2013)
(noting with regard to the Kiobel decision that “[d]espite opposition by the British and Dutch
governments to the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, the European view on the issue is far
from settled and shows a trend towards extraterritoriality—however tame it may appear—
spearheaded by the European Commission”).
9. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (listing
objections to extraterritorial application of the ATS by national governments), cited by Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
760 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21:4
watchdog.”10
The decision comes on the heels of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.11 In this equally controversial 2013 opinion, the Supreme Court held
that courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS for violations of
human rights in the territory of a foreign state only “where the claims touch
and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.”12
Because Kiobel was a dispute between Nigerian nationals against foreign
corporations for human rights violations committed in Nigeria, the Supreme
Court denied a cause of action. This left open the question addressed in
Jesner: where a sufficient connection to the U.S. territory is given, does
liability under the ATS extend to corporate defendants? Because the Court
granted certiorari to address this question shortly after it had decided Kiobel,
the negative outcome in Jesner came as a surprise to many.13
However, this article argues that the decision is far from serendipitous.
It seems consistent with not only Kiobel, but the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in other recent decisions. For example, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires SA v.
Brown,14 Daimler A.G. v. Bauman,15 and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court,16 the Court has limited personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations based on similar foreign policy concerns as those expressed in
Kiobel and Jesner. In Daimler, the only ATS case in the triad, the Court
denied personal jurisdiction over foreign headquartered defendant Daimler
10. Marc-Philippe Weller, Luca Kaller & Alix Schulz, Haftung deutscher Unternehmen
für Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Ausland, 216 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 387,
391–92 (2016) (Ger.) (citing Coester-Waltjen, FESTSCHRIFT FÜRROLFSCHÜTZE 27, 28 (2014))
(stating that recent developments indicate that European courts might take over this role); see
also Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 400–01 (2018) (stating that
“[w]ith the door closing on ATS suits in federal courts, attention is turning to suits asserting
human rights claims in state courts based on state or foreign tort law or international law, and
in federal courts based on state tort law”).
11. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 108.
12. Id. at 124 (illustrating that in absence of such close connection to the territory of the
United States, the Court held, “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS”).
13. See Milena Sterio, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations: The Future of
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 127, 149 (2018) (speculating in an
article predating the Supreme Court decision that “the Court will more likely rule in favor of
the plaintiffs/petitioners”); Ambassador David Scheffer, Is the Presumption of Corporate
Impunity Dead?, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 213, 215 (2018) (doubting that the Supreme
Court would “invoke[] the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law in favor
of Arab Bank . . . because the Supreme Court presumably granted certiorari only for the
purpose of addressing the issue of corporate liability”).
14. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
15. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
16. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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for alleged human rights violations involving its Argentinian subsidiary.17
While Kiobel and Jesner focused on the ATS, the court in Daimler did not
even problematize ATS jurisdiction. It decided the case based on the lack of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendant Daimler. Personal jurisdiction,
surprisingly, was not at issue during the Jesner litigation. However, in both
Daimler and Jesner, the Court expressed strong concern for the sovereignty
rights of foreign states.18 Jesner confirms a trend towards more judicial
reticence already underlying its reasoning in Daimler.19 In this regard, both
decisions suggest an increasing convergence of U.S. and foreign attitudes
towards judicial discretion as well as personal jurisdiction rules.20 This
consideration for foreign interests may seem like a positive development
from an international perspective. However, all three decisions taken
together lead to significant jurisdictional and substantive gaps in the ability
of victims to hold multi-national corporations (MNCs) civilly liable for
violations of international human rights for as long as the legislator does not
take over the task of filling in the blanks left by the Supreme Court’s
restrictions.21 This result seems paradoxical in an era of growing
international concern for corporate entanglement in human rights abuses and
multiplying public and private initiatives, including regulation and
successful litigation to hold MNCs accountable—including in some of the
countries whose governments have previously condemned the long arm of
17. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 120 (“The complaint alleged that during Argentina’s 1976–
1983 ‘Dirty War,’ Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes–Benz Argentina (MB
Argentina) collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain
MB Argentina workers, among them, plaintiffs or persons closely related to plaintiffs.”).
18. Concern about intrusion into foreign affairs was already a leitmotif in the Court’s
previous ATS opinions. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116–17
(2013) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004)) (explaining that ATS
is strictly jurisdictional); see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 142 (justifying limitations on personal
jurisdiction by “[c]onsiderations of international rapport”).
19. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141–42 (referring to the more limited approach to personal
jurisdiction in the European Union); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 32 (2014) (noting that in recent
decisions on personal jurisdiction “the Court continues to attempt to make policy judgments
better handled by legislation than episodic bursts of confusing jurisdictional opinions”).
20. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reconciling Transnational Jurisdiction: A
Comparative Approach to Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in US
Courts, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1243, 1290 (2018) (analyzing Daimler and pointing
towards the remaining differences between US and European rules).
21. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test, 11 SETONHALL
CIR. REV. 1, 32 (2014) (noting that in recent decisions on personal jurisdiction “the Court
continues to attempt to make policy judgments better handled by legislation than episodic
bursts of confusing jurisdictional opinions”).
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U.S. ATS jurisdiction.22
This article examines the growing role of human rights in corporate
social responsibility, international and domestic regulation, and civil
litigation. It does not attempt to establish whether Jesner was decided
correctly, nor does it develop a new system of substantive rules to hold
MNCs accountable for human rights abuses, which have been expertly
discussed elsewhere.23 The article focuses on the international jurisdictional
and choice of law issues, which civil complaints against foreignMNCs entail
in a post-Jesner world. This topic has received far less attention than the
appropriate legal basis for substantive claims. However, the place of the
litigation as well as the rules determining the applicable law, commonly
jointly referred to as private international law, have a direct impact on the
outcome of private human rights cases.24 Therefore, the success of a
22. See supra note 9 (listing objections to extraterritorial application of the ATS by
national governments); see also infra Part I(A). The most prominent example of a non-
compulsory measure with global reach is probably the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. See Human
Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, at 2 (July 6, 2011) (endorsing the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, in U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011)).
23. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Daniel R. Cahoy, & Lucien J. Dhooge, Corporate
Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights in the Post-Kiobel World, 102 KY. L.J. 601, 642
(2013) (suggesting a private right of action based on a corporation’s false, voluntary
statements); see also Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, supra note 6, at 400 n.11
(“arguing that ‘demise of ATS will signal rise of transnational tort litigation’ of human rights
claims”) (citing Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of
Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1091 (2014)); Donald Earl Childress
III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation,
100 GEO. L.J. 709, 715 (2012) (arguing that human rights claimants will increasingly rely on
state and foreign law); Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy
Analysis of Litigating International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 139, 179–84 (2006); Marco Simons, Keynote Address, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum: A Practitioner’s Viewpoint, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 28, 41 (2013) (mentioning that
“there is still no likelihood that transnational human rights litigation is going away anytime
soon—the state courts remain open to transnational lawsuits for transitory torts”); Beth
Stephens, State Law Claims: The Next Phase of Human Rights Litigation, 108 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 442, 442 (2014) (stating that “victims of human rights abuses
[after Kiobel] will increasingly file their claims in state courts”); Christopher A. Whytock,
Donald Earl Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, After Kiobel—International Human Rights
Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (arguing
that “plaintiffs alleging human rights violations are increasingly likely to consider pursuing
their claims in state courts or under state law”); Svetlana Meyerzen Nagiel, An Overlooked
Gateway to Victim Compensation: How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights
Claims, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133, 133 (2007) (advocating “state statutory and
common law causes of action” as “viable alternatives” to ATS).
24. See Ekatarina Aristova, Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations in the
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renovated legal framework to hold MNCs civilly liable largely depends on
the underlying rules that govern domestic courts’ jurisdiction and applicable
law.25 This article finds that these rules, despite the Supreme Court’s
recurring consideration of other countries’ laws, continue to diverge.26 At its
current state, U.S. personal jurisdiction rules are more restrictive than, for
example EU rules, and would hinder most cases against foreign corporations
before U.S. courts.27 The differences between legal systems lead to
protection gaps for victims of international human rights abuses. To assure
effective assertion of private rights for plaintiffs, while respecting legitimate
business and foreign governments’ sovereignty interests, a harmonized
regime needs to address jurisdiction, applicable law, as well as substantive
rules. However, since the Court clearly stated that the ATS is a
jurisdictional—not substantive—statute, rather than closing the door on
corporate liability for human rights violations, the decision may offer new
opportunities for courts and domestic and international legislators to develop
a coherent system for international corporate human rights litigation outside
the ATS framework.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the development and
current state of the business and human rights debate and provides an
overview of U.S. and international corporate human rights regulation and
litigation. Part II situates the Jesner decision within recent Supreme Court
precedent on U.S. courts’ personal jurisdiction over foreign corporate
defendants. Part III compares U.S. to EU personal jurisdiction rules and
discusses their suitability to provide effective remedies for human rights
victims while balancing competing private and public interests. Part IV
concludes.
English Courts: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 6, 21 (2018) (referring
to the changing role of private international law in an era of globalization, which historically
was value-neutral).
25. See id. at 10 (arguing that “[t]he territorial focus of the adjudicative jurisdiction is
often contrary to the transnational nature of the TNC’s activities”).
26. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141–42 (2014) (pointing to EU
jurisdiction rules).
27. See id. at 152 (holding that general personal jurisdiction requires that the defendant’s
“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at
home in the forum State” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011))).
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I. JESNER, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ANDHUMAN
RIGHTS
A. The Current State of the Business and Human Rights Relationship
1. Emergence and Development of the Business and Human Rights
Debate
Corporate human rights abuses come in various forms: dangerous
working conditions, forced or child labor, discrimination of certain groups
of employees, oppression of trade unions or collective bargaining,
environmental contamination, and limitations of property rights.28 However,
traditionally, private actors were not subject to human rights. Respect and
protection of human rights for long was primarily considered the
government’s task.29 International criminal and humanitarian law has been
applied to individuals, for example with regard to terrorism, human
trafficking or slave labor.30 Corporations, in contrast, were not only immune
from criminal prosecution or civil liability for human rights violations, over
the past decades, multinational corporations (MNCs) have systematically
exploited local communities or taken advantage of, for example, lax labor or
environmental laws to rationalize their operations in foreign countries.
Consequently, MNCs have been responsible for, inter alia, the death of
thousands of workers due to unsafe working conditions.31 Their operations
have contaminated, forced and sometimes violently relocated local
communities.32 Private enterprises allegedly have and continue to be
complicit in human rights abuses committed by oppressive governments or
28. See David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 57–58
(2005) (providing multiple examples of human rights violations).
29. See id. at 59 (“International law and human rights law have principally focused on
protecting individuals from violations by governments.”).
30. See id. at 60 n.18 (stating that “[t]he International Criminal Court has jurisdiction
only over natural persons (including corporate officers), but not over legal persons, such as
corporations”).
31. See, e.g., Tansy Hoskins, Reliving the Rana Plaza Factory Collapse: A History of
Cities in 50 Buildings, Day 22, THE GUARDIAN (last visited Apr. 23, 2015),
www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/23/rana-plaza-factory-collapse-history-cities-50-build
ings [https://perma.cc/HD8P-NUUY] (detailing the collapse of a building in Bangladesh).
32. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Whose Development? Human Rights Abuses in
Sierra Leone’s Mining Boom, HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2014/02/19/whose-development/human-rights-abuses-sierra-leones-mining-boom
[https://perma.cc/C59A-XB6S] (focusing on the human rights impact of mining activity at
African Mineral Limited in Sierra Leone).
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paramilitary groups.33 Firms have benefitted from forced labor, such as
German companies under the Nazi regime.34 They have facilitated brutal
civil wars and atrocities, e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo,35 or the
violent displacement, extrajudicial killing, and torture of civilians in Sudan.36
In light of globalization and the growing power of corporations, the
traditional view that only states are accountable under human rights law, has
been challenged.37 As a reaction to the atrocities committed during World
War II, the United Nations was created in 1945 and the concept of
international human rights emerged.38 The Nuremberg trials after World
War II are frequently cited as the starting point for the so-called business and
human rights debate, though they resulted in criminal punishment of
individuals rather than the firms complicit in the atrocities of the Third Reich
themselves.39 During the trials, Alfred Krupp, a German industrialist, as well
as several of the company’s officers were convicted, among others for the
use of slave labor. Corporate officers at I.G. Farben, another German firm
that played an important role in supporting the Nazi regime, were sentenced
33. See Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, supra note 5, at 545 (providing multiple
examples of human rights abuses committed by oppressive governments).
34. See generally ULRICH HERBERT &WILLIAM TEMPLER, HITLER’S FOREIGNWORKERS:
ENFORCED FOREIGN LABOR IN GERMANY UNDER THE THIRD REICH (2006) (detailing an
instance of forced labor by foreign workers outside their own country).
35. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, CONFLICTS IN THE
DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC OFCONGO:CAUSES, IMPACTAND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEGREATLAKES
REGION, UNITED NATIONS 92 (Sept. 2015), www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFile
s/conflits_in_drc_eng_25sept_rev1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY4G-VBKU].
36. See Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, supra note 5, at 545 (addressing Talisman’s
involvement in Sudan and other examples of corporate complicity).
37. Peter T. Muchlinski, Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?, 77
INT’L AFF., 31, 31 (2001) (attributing the shift to the “increasing integration of the global
economy”).
38. See Anna Triponel, Business & Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends in the United
States and France, 23 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 855, 858 n.8 (2008) (“stating that the
establishment of the U.N. Charter and the Nuremberg trials erased the notion that the
protection of human rights ‘lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign state’ instead
of with the international community at large”) (citing Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives:
A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1963, 1963 (1996)).
39. See Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School
of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 16, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138
S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (“There had been acknowledgement of corporate criminal liability in
international law even at Nuremberg.”) (citing David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five
Levels of CSRCompliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability under The Alien Tort Statute
and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
334, 363 (2011)); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 179–80 (2d
Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (describing the liability of IG Farben as a predicate for
individual responsibility).
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to terms of imprisonment for forced labor, providing the poison gas used in
concentration camps, and other crimes.40 In modern days, corporate officers
have been criminally charged for human rights violations, such as Dutch
business man Frans van Anraat, who in 2007 was convicted of complicity in
war crimes for the supply of chemicals used in the chemical weapon’s
program of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.41 Currently, Amesys—a subsidiary of
Bull—employees are on trial before a French court for providing
surveillance equipment to the Gaddafi government in Libya in 2007.42
In the 1990’s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and more recently, the Business &
Human Rights Resource Centre,43 started exposing and protesting the human
rights abuses of U.S. and foreign companies.44 Besides raising public
awareness and inflicting reputational damage, NGOs have since been
effective in influencing public policy and initiating numerous, though
compared to the number of abuses isolated, civil and criminal lawsuits.45
Additionally, on the academic side, serious thought started being invested in
business and human rights in the late 1980’s and 1990’s. The two main
questions that arose from these debates concerned both fairness and justice.
They can be summarized as follows: (1) “On what foundation do businesses
owe moral duties to anyone regarding human rights?”46 (2) “How extensive
40. See generally Stanley A. Goldman, A Fuhrer of Industry: Krupp Before, During and
After Nuremberg, 39 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187 (2017) (recounting Krupp
history); see also United States Military Tribunal at Nuremburg - United States v. Alfried
Krupp et al., rpt. in 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 130, THE U.N. WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION 130–59 (1949), https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-states-milit
ary-tribunal-nuremberg-united-states-v-alfried-krupp-et-al [https://perma.cc/S6XV-XZEG]
(summarizing the course of the most consequential proceedings taken against persons accused
of committing war crimes during World War II).
41. See Public Prosecutor v. Frans Cornelis Adrianus van Anraat, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES DATABASE (ICD), http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/168/Van-
Anraat/ [https://perma.cc/M9CY-YZTA] (outlining the procedural history and decision by the
Court of Appeal of The Hague, The Netherlands).
42. See Amesys lawsuit (re Lybia), BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE
(last visited Apr. 21, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/amesys-lawsuit-re-lib
ya-0 [https://perma.cc/49ZL-V45Z] (providing a summary of Amesys lawsuit).
43. BUSINESS &HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, https://www.business-humanrights.
org/en [https://perma.cc/HTM4-VVX7] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
44. James Paul, Global Policy Forum: The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility Crisis,
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (2006), www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/3
1423.html [https://perma.cc/5V3T-PWTF].
45. Lina Marcinkute, The Role of Human Rights NGO’s: Human Rights Defenders or
State Sovereignty Destroyers?, 4 BALTIC J. L. & POL. 55 (2011).
46. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 49 (1989); see also
John J. Keller,Multinational Business and Human Rights, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 271,
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are the human rights duties of business in situations where business has no
direct or indirect connection to human rights violations?”47 Hence, the
debate over business’s accountability for human rights evolved from an
international criminal lawmatter to an issue of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) and civil liability, and the debate, as the following section will
illustrate, is far from being settled.
2. Corporate Embrace of Business and Human Rights
Beyond NGO activism, international conventions, and academic
writing, there have been some broader trends pushing for business and
human rights.48 On the one hand, advances in information technology over
the past thirty years illuminate previously obfuscated regions and have led
to a shift in consumer and investor awareness that explains their increasing
preference for moral action.49 On the other hand, the increasing wealth,
power, and influence of MNCs over state actors puts them in a position to
not only protect but also to promote human rights.50 These trends, and more,
are slowly causing businesses to change their underlying moral framework
away from shareholder primacy or utilitarian business models towards
stakeholder engagement and CSR.51 However, there have been several
issues that have slowed down businesses’ adoption of human rights and that
explain why, even today, establishing a consensus about business and human
rights that includes corporations remains elusive. This may be because CSR
271–72 (1994) (questioning “what obligations do corporations have in the face both of host
country human rights violations and of their need to pursue low-wage environments and
rapidly expanding markets?”).
47. Michael A. Santoro, Business and Human Rights in Historical Perspective, 14 J.
HUM. RTS. 155, 155–56 (2015).
48. See infra Part I(A)(2) (describing international conventions in greater detail).
49. See Business and Human Rights: A Progress Report, OCHR.ORG (2000), https://ww
w.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BusinessHRen.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3WQ-LQQM]
(explaining that human rights are a key performance indicator for corporations throughout the
world).
50. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER & BRUCE MAZLISH, LEVIATHANS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW GLOBAL HISTORY 136–39 (2005) (comparing nations and
MNCs economic power); see also Anna Triponel, Business & Human Rights Law: Diverging
Trends in the United States and France, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 855, 860 (2008) (internal
citations omitted) (“The dramatic increase in corporations’ wealth, power, influence and
responsibility over the last twenty years explains why corporations, especially transnational
corporations (‘TNCs’), are increasingly expected to respect human rights law directly.”).
51. See Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the
Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, 34 BUS. HORIZONS 39, 40 (1991)
(describing the shift from social responsibility, over social responsiveness, to corporate social
performance).
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generally focuses on the positive impact a corporation has on society,
whereas human rights mainly focus on negative impact.52 One reason why
many firms have been slow to adopt human rights is that they are already
preoccupied with their other CSR initiatives. Because many corporations
already are pursuing CSR actions, they may see human rights norms as a
challenge to their existing CSR programs. Even though human rights have
more recently been regarded as complementary to CSR, the preference of
focusing on other forms of CSR remains.53 No customer or investor will be
impressed that a company is not violating human rights, as this would be the
underlying expectation, while a CSR program that builds on positive impact
can create value for the business through a favorable image.54
Another reason business is reluctant to accept responsibility for human
rights is the evolving nature of those rights and the reach of responsibility of
human rights obligations. The United Nations and human rights advocates
have made clear that even if a company does not violate human rights
themselves, they should be accountable for their entire supply chain.55
Additionally, there has been a trend in the human rights debate to call for the
proactive protection of human rights like a living wage and gender equality,
which are not easily definable.56 Businesses worry that if they accept one
52. See id. at 751 (“[W]hile CSR has lacked a constitutive focus on people’s rights, the
business and human rights debate has lacked the focus on the positive potential of corporations
to be a part of the solution rather than only a part of the problem.”).
53. See Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging
the Great Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICSQ. 747 (2012) (pointing towards the UNGuiding Principles
as the starting point for this shift in perception).
54. See generallyMichael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to
Reinvent Capitalism - and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, 89 HARV. BUS. REV.
62 (2011) (describing companies being widely perceived as prospering at the expense of the
broader community, and being blamed for society’s failures even when they begin to embrace
corporate responsibility).
55. SeeMichael A. Santoro, Business and Human Rights in Historical Perspective, 14 J.
HUM.RTS., 155, 155 (2015) (noting that human rights activists advocate for an additional duty
to help “prevent and remedy human rights violations committed by others”); see also James
G. Stewart, Complicity in Business and Human Rights, 109 PROC. ANN.MEETING, AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. 181–84 (2015) (explaining that international law needs to reevaluate its stance
towards issues of complicity given that there has been a shift from direct violations of
international law precepts to the ways in which individuals, businesses, and states will
increasingly be complicit in international law violations); see generally Human Rights in
Supply Chains: A Call for a Binding Global Standard on Due Diligence, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (May 30, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/30/human-rights-supply-chain
s/call-binding-global-standard-due-diligence# [https://perma.cc/V684-K29V] (stating that
despite complex global supply chains being capable of offering important opportunities for
economic and social development, they can also present serious human rights risks that many
companies have failed to mitigate and respond to effectively).
56. See ‘4 In 10 Companies ‘Failing’ on Human Rights,’ WORLD BENCHMARKING
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definition of these rights they may end up accepting a much more onerous
version later on. For example, a living wage has many definitions: what
would pass as a living wage in Indonesia or India may seem like a human
rights abuse in the United States or France.57 Therefore, the risk of making
a commitment to a living wage may add a range of costs, which is why most
businesses opt for the strategy of local market value for labor.58
For the aforementioned reasons, companies still do not see compliance
with human rights as a net positive like many now consider CSR programs.
This being said, many businesses still do not yet consider even tame CSR
programs to be a net positive and will not change their current practices. This
underscores the continued need for international collaboration to create a
direct obligation for companies to respect and promote human rights through
regulation and other legal means. In this regard, while much remains to be
done, and despite the latest setbacks in Kiobel and Jesner, the business and
human rights agenda has made great strides forward on the international
level, as well as on the regional and national levels. These regulatory efforts
will be discussed in the next section.
3. Business and Human Rights Regulation
On the international level, soft law mechanisms have been employed to
regulate the conduct of MNCs and international business activities.
Prominent examples include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development’s (OECD’s) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,59
the International Labor Organization’s (ILO’s) Tripartite Declaration of
ALLIANCE (Nov. 19, 2018), www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/4-in-10-companies-failing
-on-human-rights/[https://perma.cc/ZFQ8-7DDK] (stating “virtually no companies
demonstrate strong commitments to ensuring living wages are paid to workers in their own
operations and supply chains.”).
57. See Wages in Context, WAGEINDICATOR.ORG (2019), https://wageindicator.org/salar
y/wages-in-context [https://perma.cc/L97Z-C7JP] (noting that the highest living wage
countries have a living wage 10 times or more than that of the lowest).
58. See Alexander Hijzen and Paul Swaim, Do Multinationals Promote Better Pay and
Working Conditions?, OECD OBSERVER (Oct. 2008), oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.p
hp/aid/2767/Do_multinationals_promote_better_pay_and_working_conditions_.html [https:/
/perma.cc/L5D7-XQPV] (explaining that the effect multinationals have on wages and
working conditions can be positive, but there are conditions which policymakers wishing to
attract foreign direct investment should keep in mind).
59. Report of the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
on the Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions, 18 I.L.M. 986 (1979). The OECD
updated these Guidelines in 2000. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
(2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3WY-S7C5].
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Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises,60 the United Nations
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations,61 the United
Nations Global Compact,62 and, most prominently, the Guiding Principles
for Business and Human Rights.63 The principles provide the so-called
protect, respect, and remedy framework for human rights. They lay out
specific obligations, processes, and ways of implementations that companies
are expected to adopt to pursue the respect of human rights.64 These
proposals for pragmatic implementation distinguish the Guiding Principles
from other international soft law.65 Additionally, the United Nations
encourages countries to develop and enact national action plans (NAP’s) to
implement the Guiding Principle’s framework,66 though the first examples
of implementation have received mixed approval from the human rights
community.67 Additionally, an inter-governmental working group
established by the U.N. Human Rights Council is currently elaborating “an
international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human
rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business
enterprises.”68
On the regional or national level, governments have taken action to hold
60. International Labour Organisation, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422, 6 (1978), http://www.ilo.org/pu
blic/english/employment/multi/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9R4B-YCJ3].
61. Comm. on Human Rights, Subcomm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
Rep. on its 55th Sess. (Aug. 13, 2003), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. (Aug. 26, 2003), E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.
62. About the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html [https://perma.cc/G9NG-WTTG] (last visited
Nov. 13, 2018).
63. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED
NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDB5-N2MY].
64. See Bird, Cahoy & Dhooge, supra note 23, at 622 (“[The principles] present specific
obligations, processes, and implementations that firms are expected to pursue in respecting
human rights.”).
65. See id. (describing Ruggie’s “principled pragmatism” approach).
66. See STATE NATIONAL ACTION PLANS ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/en/iss
ues/business/pages/nationalactionplans.aspx [https://perma.cc/S9WD-DPXD] (providing a
list of countries that have produced a NAP).
67. Cindy Woods, Assessments of Existing National Action Plans (NAPs) on Business
and Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 23,
2017), www.icar.ngo/publications/2017/8/23/assessments-of-existing-national-action-plans-
naps-on-business-and-human-rights-august-2017 [https://perma.cc/DY7M-XQ6F].
68. Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, at 2 (July 14, 2014).
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businesses accountable for their international human rights impacts through
mandatory reporting. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act includes a provision requiring corporations to
disclose the use of “conflict minerals” in products manufactured by covered
entities.69 Despite criticism and limited success of the U.S. conflict minerals
regulation,70 the European Union has followed the U.S. example and in 2017
enacted the EU conflict minerals regulation.71 Additionally, the 2014 EU
directive on non-financial disclosure requires companies incorporated in
member states “to disclose in their management report relevant and material
information on policies, outcomes and risks, including due diligence that
they implement, and relevant non-financial key performance indicators
concerning environmental aspects, social and employee-related matters,
respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on
the boards of directors.”72 Individual Member States, including the U.K.,
Sweden, Denmark, France, and Spain have their own non-financial
disclosure policies as well, which include mandatory reporting on human
rights policies and programs.73
In 2015, the United Kingdom enacted the Modern Slavery Act.74 In its
final version, the act compels large corporations to publish a statement about
how they are preventing slavery in their supply chain.75 These reports are
published online for anyone to see with the intent of increasing social
pressure on firms who report lackluster anti-slavery due diligence.76 Most
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The
SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315,
1316 (2012); Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Social
Irresponsibility for Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84 (2015).
70. The regulation has been criticized for its unintended consequences, i.e. in an effort to
avoid reporting obligations, companies simply refrain from sourcing in the listed countries
thereby hurting their already fragile economies. SeeWoody, supra note 69, at 1346 (arguing
that the reporting requirements are likely to lead to a “de facto embargo”).
71. Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May
2017, 2017 O.J. (L 130/1) (listing “supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers
of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-
risk areas”).
72. European Commission Memorandum, Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity
Information by Large Companies and Groups - Frequently Asked Questions, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (Apr. 5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-14-301en.htm [http
s://perma.cc/YDX3-L8A7].
73. Id.
74. MODERN SLAVERY ACT OF 2015, § 54, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30
/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/8WKD-VTBJ].
75. Id. at § 54(1).
76. See TISCREPORTMODERN SLAVERYACT COMPLIANCE TRACKER, https://tiscreport.o
rg (tracking companies which comply with the TISCreport Modern Slavery Act).
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recently, the French legislator, in probably the most far-reaching regulatory
effort thus far, has enacted a law that obliges French companies with 5,000
or more employees to monitor subsidiaries and suppliers to prevent grave
violations of human rights, basic liberties, health, safety, and environmental
risk.77 Similar mandatory human rights due diligence laws are under
discussion in various European countries and Canada.78
In the United States, regulation concerned with business and human
rights has centered on mandatory disclosure. At the federal level (besides
Dodd Frank Act section 1502 on conflict minerals), mandatory corporate
human rights reporting has emerged around specific issues, such as forced
labor, human trafficking, and specific geographical zones.79 These reporting
obligations have compelled companies to publish information on their
policies and processes, including those intended to prevent and mitigate
violations of human rights in connection with new investments in certain
countries.80 Proposed legislation for more comprehensive human rights
reporting has been introduced to the United States Congress as an
amendment to the “Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain
companies to disclose information describing any measures the company has
taken to identify and address conditions of forced labor, slavery, human
trafficking, and the worst forms of child labor within the company’s supply
chains.”81
77. Assemblée Nationale, PROPOSITION DE LOI RELATIVE AU DEVOIR DE VIGILANCE DES
SOCIETES MERES ET DES ENTREPRISES DONNEUSES D’ORDRE (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.assem
blee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0924.asp [https://perma.cc/Q79Y-8L23]; see also Gerlinde Berger-
Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globalization
and Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 167, 206 (2018) (“This law, which goes beyond
disclosure to a substantive monitoring obligation, may represent a significant shift in policy
to make companies more directly responsible for the activities of their suppliers.”).
78. See generally The Rise of Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence in the Supply
Chain, ECOVADIS, http://www.ecovadis.com/library/human-rights-due-diligence/#download
[https://perma.cc/RR7C-QAES] (providing ethical insights of global supply chains).
79. Anthony Ewing, MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING (2015), https://logoscons
ulting.net/mandatory-human-rights-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/33HD-N49Y].
80. See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, htt
ps://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/pages/office-of-foreign-assets-
control.aspx [https://perma.cc/2VLC-3Q4R] (2013) (outlining the role of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of the Treasury); 2016 Consultation on
Renewing the U.S. Reporting Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma/Myanmar,
INSTITUTE FOR HUMANRIGHTS AND BUSINESS (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.ihrb.org/focus-are
as/myanmar/submission-reporting-requirements-responsible-investment-myanmar-2016 [htt
ps://perma.cc/UNV4-ZMKG] (describing reporting requirements for certain U.S. investments
in Myanmar).
81. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2018, H.R.
7089, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/7089
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Besides the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (SB
657) on human trafficking, there is no state-level legislation specifically
addressing corporate accountability for human rights. Hence, private
litigation against corporate defendants in the United States primarily has
been based on the ATS. The next section outlines U.S. courts’ ATS
jurisprudence prior to Jesner. The following section summarizes that
decision.
B. Human Rights and ATS Litigation in the United States
Although a comprehensive review of human rights litigation against
corporations in the United States is beyond the scope of this article, an
overview of how private litigation evolved in this respect is necessary to
place Jesner in proper perspective. Because corporations as private entities
typically cannot be sued before international tribunals, enforcement of direct
corporate human rights liability is generally left to domestic courts.82
In the United States, the primary vehicle for holding corporations civilly
liable for their involvement in international human rights violations is the
ATS.83 The ATS is a unique statute, unparalleled in both domestic and
international legislation. For long, commentators and courts have pointed to
difficulties in interpreting the ATS because of a lack of legislative history.84
Justice Gorsuch, in his concurrence in Jesner, went as far as to suggest
finally ending the “ATS exceptionalism.”85
The ATS provides original jurisdiction to the district courts in cases
?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22business+supply+chain+transparency%22%5D%7D
&r=1 [https://perma.cc/KP9F-MWY8]. Prospects of the bill being enacted seem low given
that earlier versions were previously introduced to both the House and the Senate in 2014 and
2015, but so far have been unsuccessful. H.R. 7089 (115th): Business Supply Chain
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2018, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/115/hr7089 [https://perma.cc/Z5AT-NPR6].
82. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating
International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 81, 87 (1999) (stating “the legal status of
MNCs under international law has not advanced significantly . . . since the International Court
of Justice despaired of finding suitable international legal principles for addressing the
litigation surrounding the Barcelona Traction company and simply decided that famous case
on the basis of domestic laws.”).
83. See Triponel, supra note 50, at 904–05 (noting that “the United States is not party to
all international human rights agreements, and even when it is, the agreements need
implementing legislation” and pointing towards the pioneering role of U.S. courts in using
“civil remedies to sue human rights violators under the Alien Torts Claim Act [ATCA]”).
84. See Bird, Cahoy & Dhooge, supra note 23, at 604 (referencing multiple court
decisions that have commented on the difficulties of interpreting the ATS).
85. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1412 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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where an alien alleges “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”86 The ATS was enacted by the First Congress in 1789 but
laid largely dormant until it was resurrected by the Second Circuit in
Filartiga to allow the heirs of an alleged Paraguayan torture victim to sue a
Paraguayan police officer living in New York.87 In the wake of this decision,
Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),88 but made
clear that the ATS should “remain intact to permit suits based on other norms
that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law.”89 It remained unclear, however, what type of torts fit
those standards beyond the historical cases Congress had in mind when
enacting the ATS, namely “interference with ambassadors, and piracy.”90 In
yet another prominent decision, the Second Circuit, in Kadic v. Karadzic91
held that the ATS could be used against private individuals.92 What followed
was the first series of ATS cases against corporate defendants before federal
courts.93 Against this background, the Supreme Court in its 2004 decision in
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
87. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the Alien Tort
Statute provides federal jurisdiction whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within U.S. borders).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
89. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102–367,
pt. 1, at 4 (1991)).
90. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1392 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715
(2004)).
91. 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e do not agree that the law of nations, as
understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain
forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals.”).
92. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 82 (citing Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under
International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 594 (1997))
(noting that the application of international norms against non-State actors is the most
problematic element of the ATS).
93. Though most of these cases, such as Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d
88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000), were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, a high-profile case against
Unocal for allegedly benefitting from forced labor and other human rights violations during
its Yadana gas pipeline construction project in Burma was settled. See Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Plaintiffs seek injunctive, declaratory and
compensatory relief for alleged international human rights violations perpetrated by
defendants Unocal, Total and MOGE’s joint venture, the Yadana gas pipeline project.”). See
Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, supra note 5, at 550–54, for an overview of U.S. and
international human rights related foreign direct liability cases and their outcome. The authors
find “[t]o date, with the recent exception of Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary’s conviction by a court
in the Netherlands in January 2014, no company has been found guilty of human rights
violations in a foreign direct liability case.” Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, supra note 5, at
546. However, their study suggests that there might be other positive effects of human rights
litigation “despite this modest judicial success.” Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, supra note
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain sought to give some guidance to lower courts.94
In Sosa, the Supreme Court recognized serious separation-of-powers
and foreign relations concerns that call for “judicial restraint” in ATS
litigation.95 The Court held that “federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law
norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than
the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”96 However,
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, also acknowledged that the ATS
under certain narrow circumstances allowed for recognition of new classes
of international norms.97 This lead to a two-step test to determine if a norm
qualifies for purposes of international law under the ATS, later used inter
alia in Jesner: (1) A plaintiff must show that the alleged action in violation
of international law is “of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”98
(2) If there is a specific norm controlling, it must be “determined further
whether allowing this case to proceed under the ATS is a proper exercise of
judicial discretion, or instead whether caution requires the political branches
to grant specific authority before corporate liability can be imposed.”99
Finally, the Court noted that the “determination whether a norm is
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed,
inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical
5, at 546.
94. See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694 (“The ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action. This does not mean, as Sosa contends, that the ATS was stillborn
because any claim for relief required a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes
of action. Rather, the reasonable inference from history and practice is that the ATS was
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law, on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations thought to carry personal liability at the time: offenses against ambassadors,
violation of safe conducts, and piracy.”).
95. Id. at 725 (“There are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind. Accordingly,
we think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”). See also id.
at 727 (“It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own State
and Federal Governments’ power, but quite another to consider suits under rules that would
go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and
to hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits.”).
96. Id. at 732.
97. See id. at 729 (noting that “[j]udicial power should be exercised on the understanding
that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of
international norms today”).
98. Id. at 732.
99. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018).
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consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal
courts.”100 The latter include, for example, exhaustion of remedies in the
plaintiff’s home state, or political questions better decided by the executive
branch.101 The question whether “international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual,” at issue in
Kadic and a conflicting lower court decision in Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic,102 was left unanswered.103
The later issue was raised, but was ultimately not decided in Kiobel, the
second ATS case before the Supreme Court. After hearing oral arguments,
the Court changed the legal issue it originally had granted certiorari for and
answered the question “[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATCA]
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States” instead.104 The Court held that recognized “principles underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality . . . constrain courts exercising their
power under the ATS” outside of the territory of the United States and that
“nothing in the [ATS] rebuts that presumption.”105 The Court added, even
where the “claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”106
Besides the original question of corporate liability under the ATS,
Kiobel left many questions open. For example, the Court did not address the
precise contours of the territoriality requirement,107 nor “whether domestic
or international law should apply to the issue of whether corporations can be
sued under the [ATCA]?”108
100. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
101. See id. at 733 n.21 (“This requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the only
principle limiting the availability of relief in the federal courts for violations of customary
international law . . . .Another possible limitation that we need not apply here is a policy of
case-specific deference to the political branches.”).
102. Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (C.A.D.C. 1984).
103. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
104. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013). See also Sterio,
supra note 13, at 136 (“By requesting parties to prepare briefs and arguments on the issue of
whether a corporation may be sued under the ATCA for acts committed abroad (which may
have violated the law of nations), the Supreme Court avoided directly addressing the issue of
corporate liability under the [ATS].”) (citing Michael Kelly, Atrocities by Corporate Actors:
A Historical Perspective, 50 CASEW. RES. J. INT’L L. (2018)).
105. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117, 124.
106. Id. at 125 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264–73 (2010)).
107. Id. at 124–25.
108. Sterio, supra note 13, at 128.
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C. The Jesner Decision
Against this background, expectations in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jesner were high.109 The petitioners in Jesner, the
majority of which were foreign nationals,110 alleged that the defendant, Arab
Bank, had facilitated “terrorist attacks committed in Israel, the West Bank,
and Gaza between 1995 and 2005 by maintaining accounts for known
terrorists, accepting donations that would be used to fund terrorism, and
distributing millions of dollars to families of suicide bombers (so-called
‘martyrdom payments’).”111 Arab Bank is a major Jordanian financial
institution with over 600 branches worldwide.112 In the lawsuit, it described
itself as “an active and leading partner in the socio-economic development”
of the Middle East.113 The decision notes that the Israeli government has
worked with the bank to transfer taxes collected for the Palestinian
Authority, and the United States government characterized the bank as a
“constructive partner” in its efforts to combat money laundering and the
financing of terrorism.114 In their complaint, the petitioners alleged that Arab
Bank used its NewYork branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions that
benefitted terrorists through the Clearing House Interbank Payment System
(CHIPS).115 Dollar-denominated transactions are often used by foreign
banks to facilitate currency exchanges/transactions between foreign banks,
and CHIPS is commonly used for such transactions and for transactions
where the dollar is used as an intermediate currency to facilitate currency
exchange.116 The transactions are mechanical, without human intervention,
and nearly instantaneous.117 They occur predominantly in the United States
109. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaak, The Inconsequential Choice-of-Law Question Posed by
Jesner v. Arab Bank, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 368 (2018) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court “should continue to leave the door open to corporate liability under the
ATS”)(citing Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004)).
110. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018) (“A significant majority
of the plaintiffs in these lawsuits—about 6,000 of them—are foreign nationals whose claims
arise under the ATS. These foreign nationals are petitioners here.”).
111. Sterio, supra note 13, at 129 (citing complaint at *38, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No.
CV 06 3869, 2006 WL 4807223 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006)).
112. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394; see alsoAmy Howe, An Introduction to the Alien Tort
Statute and Corporate Liability: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (July 24, 2017), http://w
ww.scotusblog.com/2017/07/introduction-alien-tort-statute-corporate-liability-plain-english/
[https://perma.cc/95QL-XLDJ] (describing the ATS and summarizing ATS case law).
113. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1395.
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but are also used by major foreign banks both in the United States and
abroad.118 Additionally, the petitioners claimed that Arab Bank used its New
York branch to launder money for a Texas-based charity “affiliated with
Hamas.”119
Against these factual circumstances, the Supreme Court, in Jesner,
finally addressed the question whether the United States judiciary has
authority in an ATS action to determine if a corporation has, by its human
agents, violated tenets of international law that protect human rights and
impose liability on the corporation.120 To answer this question two analyses
must occur: (1) Does the law of nations impose liability on corporations for
human rights violations committed by its employees; and (2) do courts have
the authority and discretion in an ATS suit to impose liability on a
corporation without a specific direction from Congress to do so?121
Regarding the first question, the Supreme Court discussed whether
there was a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of corporate liability
under international law.122 Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion for the
majority, argued that jurisdiction of historical international criminal
tribunals, such as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, as well as more recent
international tribunals was limited to natural persons, supporting the position
that there was no such norm.123 The Court ultimately did not make a final
decision on the issue. Instead, it stated, “[t]here is at least sufficient doubt
on the point to turn to Sosa’s second question—whether the Judiciary must
defer to Congress, allowing it to determine in the first instance whether that
universal norm has been recognized and, if so, whether it is prudent and
necessary to direct its enforcement in suits under the ATS.”124
In answering that question, the Court looked for a “statutory analogy to
an ATS common-law action” in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(TVPA), which created an express cause of action for victims of torture and
118. Id. at 1394–95.
119. Id. at 1395.
120. Id. at 1394.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1400 (“In the Court of Appeals’ decision in Kiobel, the majority opinion by
Judge Cabranes interpreted footnote 20 to mean that corporate defendants may be held liable
under the ATS only if there is a specific, universal, and obligatory norm that corporations are
liable for violations of international law.”) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)).
123. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1401 (noting “[t]he drafters of the Rome Statute considered,
but rejected, a proposal to give the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over
corporations.”) (citing Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT:ACOMMENTARY 767, 778–79 (A. Cassese
et al. eds. 2002)).
124. Id. at 1402.
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extrajudicial killing in violation of international law.125 It argued, “[t]he key
feature of the TVPA for this case is that it limits liability to ‘individuals,’
which, the Court has held, unambiguously limits liability to natural
persons.126 When enacting the TVPA, Congress carefully delineated the
law’s boundaries so that it could “weigh the foreign-policy implications of
its rule.”127 “The TVPA reflects Congress’ considered judgment of the
proper structure for a right of action under the ATS.”128 From this, the Court
concluded, “[a]bsent a compelling justification, courts should not deviate
from that model.”129
On the second question, the Court analyzed the ATS. It found that when
enacted, the statute was intended to only “furnish jurisdiction for a relatively
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.”130 The Court
reaffirmed its holding in Sosa that “[t]he ATS is ‘strictly jurisdictional’ and
does not by its own terms provide or delineate the definition of a cause of
action for violations of international law.”131 Its main objective at the time
of its creation was to “avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the
availability of a federal forum where the failure to provide one might cause
another nation to hold the United States responsible for an injury to a foreign
citizen.”132 In Jesner, according to the majority, quite the opposite was true,
as the long-drawn litigation apparently had put a strain on United States-
Jordanian relations. The Court did not answer the question of whether proper
application of Sosa would preclude courts from ever recognizing new ATS
causes of action. According to the majority, separation-of-powers concerns
prevent courts from extending ATS liability to foreign corporations absent
further action from Congress.133 Additionally, the Court was concerned that
extending liability under the ATS to corporations “would imply that other
nations, also applying the law of nations, could hale [U.S. corporations] into
their courts for alleged violations of the law of nations.”134 This increased
global risk, in turn, could “hinder global investment in developing
economies, where it is most needed.”135
125. Id. at 1403.
126. Id. at 1404 (citing Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 453–56 (2012)).
127. Id. at 1403 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1397 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004)) (internal
quotations omitted).
131. Id. at 1389 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14).
132. Id. at 1397 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715–19; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 123–24).
133. Id. at 1402–03.
134. Id. at 1405 (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124).
135. Id. at 1405–06 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in American Isuzu
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Based on these considerations, the Court decided that common-law
liability under the ATS did not extend to corporations and thus, foreign
corporate defendants could not be sued before a federal U.S. court based on
the ATS. This finding leads to the following question. If the ATS is of
jurisdictional nature, and, as the Supreme Court suggests, does not allow
foreign plaintiffs to sue a foreign corporation before a U.S. federal court,
which courts do have jurisdiction over corporate human rights abuses
committed by MNCs worldwide and which are the rules that determine the
applicable law to private causes of action in these cases? This, in the absence
of international norms and tribunals, is a question for domestic courts or
legislators to decide and potentially leads to protection gaps for plaintiff-
victims if the jurisdictional or conflict of law norms diverge between
jurisdictions. The following Part will address these issues under current U.S.
law, and, as an example for a foreign jurisdiction, the law of the EU and,
where appropriate, selected individual EU member states. The analysis will
show areas of convergence as well as remaining differences and discuss how
these tendencies might inform a future harmonized legal regime for
international civil corporate human rights litigation.
II. THE ATS AND JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS IN
U.S. COURTS
While previous sections have addressed the subject-matter and
international law questions raised in previous ATS decisions, this section
looks at the ATS’s role in determining U.S. court’s jurisdiction over foreign
corporate defendants and its relationship to the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction rules for this matter. Personal jurisdiction, surprisingly, despite
the factual similarities between both cases, was not at issue in the Jesner
litigation, but was at the center of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler.
Daimler and related recent personal jurisdiction decisions, however, leave
important questions unanswered. The courts could have addressed these
issues in the Jesner litigation, but—surprisingly—the defendant did not
claim a lack of personal jurisdiction.136 Hence, personal jurisdiction will
continue to be a source of controversy in private human rights cases and
beyond, even with the door arguably closing on the ATS.
The following sections first analyze the ATS’s role in determining
Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, O.T. 2007, No. 07–919, p. 20) (internal quotations omitted).
136. See generally Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler
and its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS&CLARK L. REV.
675 (2015) (discussing several unanswered questions that remained after Daimler).
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jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants. They then analyze how,
hypothetically, Daimler and related decisions could have affected Jesner, or
are likely to affect future litigation outside the ATS. The section after that
looks at related procedural rules in Europe and draws conclusions for
desirable changes to U.S. law and implications for a harmonized
international system.
A. The ATS as Jurisdictional Statute
The Supreme Court, in Sosa, held that the ATS was a jurisdictional
statute.137 According to the majority in Jesner—as mentioned above—“[t]he
principal objective of the statute, when first enacted, was to avoid foreign
entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum where the
failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the United States
responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.”138 In these cases, the ATS
creates original jurisdiction for the federal courts to hear “any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”139 Hence, as a jurisdictional statute, the ATS
addresses subject matter jurisdiction but says nothing about jurisdiction over
the particular defendant. This is a question of personal jurisdiction. Personal
jurisdiction is the requirement that a given court have power over the
defendant. It typically raises the question of a sufficient connection between
the dispute and the forum to justify requiring the defendant to stand trial
before—for this purpose—any U.S. federal or state court.140 Subject-matter
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is the authority of the court to hear a specific
type of claim.141 In ATS cases, due to their international nature, typically
both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are at issue.
137. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
138. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1397 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715–19; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 123–
24).
139. It is not clear whether the ATS also applies in disputes between an alien plaintiff and
a domestic defendant. See id. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that “whereas the
ATS expressly limits the class of permissible plaintiffs to ‘alien[s],’ § 1350, it ‘does not
distinguish among classes of defendants’”) (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)).
140. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (requiring
“sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according
to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce
the obligations which appellant has incurred there.”).
141. See Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 560 (2017) (stating that
“a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction defines its power to hear cases”) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546
U.S. 303, 316 (2006)) (internal citations omitted).
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Subject-matter jurisdiction, generally, is given if the case presents a
federal question142 or in the case of diversity, i.e. if the case involves:
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,
except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction
under this subsection of an action between citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the
same State;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of
a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.143
In private human rights related cases between a foreign citizen and a
foreign corporation, diversity jurisdiction per the criteria enumerated above
would typically be missing because—as the district court in Jesner argued—
both parties were aliens.144 Federal question jurisdiction requires that the
claim arises out of federal law or is of significant federal interest.145 Federal
law includes treaties of the Unites States.146 Hence, one could argue that
international human rights norms that are part of a U.S.-ratified international
treaty are actionable before federal courts, even without having to rely on the
ATS.147 However, the U.S. government has declared most human rights
treaties to be non-self-executing, meaning that they would require
implementing legislation to be actionable.148 Whether international norms
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (laying out the rules for subject-matter jurisdiction).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
144. See In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Stat. Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 160 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ ATS claims, the only basis on which the district
court might exercise jurisdiction over these actions would be diversity of citizenship. But
‘diversity is lacking . . . where the only parties are foreign entities, or where on one side there
are citizens and aliens and on the opposite side there are only aliens.’”) (citing Universal
Licensing Corp. v. Paola del Lungo S.p.A., 293 F.3d 579, 581 (2d Cir.2002)). Diversity
jurisdiction, however, does allow for civil actions brought by an alien against a domestic U.S.
corporation according to para. 2 of the ATS, and suits between a U.S. citizen and a U.S.
corporation, in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.
145. See Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005) (citing Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 490–91 (1917).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
147. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1424 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (providing multiple examples for international conventions, which specifically
impose liability on corporations for certain norms of international law, such as financing
terrorism or bribery).
148. See Anna Triponel, Business & Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends in the United
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beyond those treaties, i.e. customary international law, provide for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction as part of federal common law, is even less
certain. The question was at issue in Sosa.149 Here, Justice Scalia argued
that following the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, federal
courts must refrain from creating common law.150 Hence, he argued, “[t]he
question is not what case or congressional action prevents federal courts
from applying the law of nations as part of the general common law; it is
what authorizes that peculiar exception from Erie’s fundamental holding that
a general common law does not exist.”151 The insight lead Scalia to conclude
that the courts were precluded from granting jurisdiction under the ATS for
cases based on international norms other than those that Congress had in
mind when enacting the statute—namely “interference with ambassadors,
and piracy.”152 The majority in Sosa, however, recognized “‘limited
enclaves in which federal courts may derive from substantive law in a
common law way,’ including the law of nations.”153 The question was not at
issue in Jesner. Nevertheless, diverging arguments expressed by Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Sotomayor in their concurrence and dissenting opinion,
respectively, suggest that Sosawas not the Court’s last word in this matter.154
While Justice Gorsuch, in line with Justice Scalia’s opinion in Sosa,
suggested limiting courts’ discretion to recognize new causes of action under
the ATS,155 Justice Sotomayor argued that Congress “granted the federal
courts jurisdiction over claims based on ‘the law of nations,’ a body of law
that Congress did not understand to be static.156 The dispute ought not to be
decided here. Even if one follows Justice Sotomayor’s broad interpretation,
States and France, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 855, 863 (2008) (citing
Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties,
1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 348–49 (2000)).
149. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729–30 (2004) (explaining that, following
Erie, there are “limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive from substantive law in
a common law way,” including the law of nations).
150. See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
151. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 744 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1392 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715).
153. Id. at 1428 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30).
154. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when
§ 1350 was enacted.”).
155. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1419 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (stating that “the decision to
impose sanctions in disputes between foreigners over international norms is not ours to
make”).
156. Id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26
F.Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)).
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the ATS only provides subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence, plaintiffs’ ability
to sue a foreign corporation before U.S. courts would still depend upon the
court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which largely depends on
sufficient connections between the defendant and the forum.
However, the Supreme Court in Kiobel discussed the issue of sufficient
connections to the United States—typically an issue of personal
jurisdiction—as part of ATS jurisdiction. It found that a suit under the ATS
could not be brought without some connection to the United States based on
the presumption against extraterritoriality.157 In doing so, the Court
unnecessarily restricted federal ATS jurisdiction and blurred the lines
between subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. It would have been
analytically clearer, and potentially lead to more coherent results, to discuss
sufficient connections between the dispute and the forum as part of the
personal jurisdiction analysis. The odd result of the Supreme Court’s
limitations on ATS jurisdiction in Kiobel, and further restrictions in Jesner,
is that these decisions remove human rights litigation and similar issues
involving international norms against foreign defendants from the
jurisdiction of federal courts.158 This will lead more and more plaintiffs to
sue foreign corporations before state courts based on far-reaching
jurisdictional state statutes. This is a more than questionable result, given
the international character of these cases. Moreover, even with a broader
interpretation of the ATS, nothing would prevent a federal court from
declining to decide a case that lacks a sufficient connection to the U.S.
territory as a matter of a personal jurisdiction.
Despite the Supreme Court’s unequivocal acknowledgement of the
ATS’s jurisdictional role, the Court continues to blur the lines, not only
between subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, but also
between procedural and substantive law. In Jesner, the Court explicitly
avoided deciding the question of sufficient connections between the dispute
and the territory of the United States. Instead, it argued that “[t]he question
whether foreign corporations are subject to liability under the ATS should
be addressed; for, if there is no liability for Arab Bank, the lengthy and costly
157. SeeKiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) (“The principles
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their
power under the ATS.”).
158. See also Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1434 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that “the First
Congress created the ATS because it wanted foreign plaintiffs to be able to bring their claims
in federal court and sue for law-of-nations violations. A suit for state law battery, even if
based on the same alleged conduct, is not the equivalent of a federal suit for torture; the latter
contributes to the uptake of international human rights norms, and the former does not.”)
(internal citations omitted).
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litigation concerning whether corporate contacts like those alleged here
suffice to impose liability would be pointless.”159 As laudable as the Court’s
concern for the economic costs and diplomatic tensions resulting from
prolonged litigation are, the argument camouflages the true issue at stake in
private international human rights litigation, which is the question of whether
U.S. courts should hear disputes arising out of human rights violations
between two private, foreign parties.160 Admitting “foreign-cubed” cases
before U.S. courts raises questions of litigation fairness for plaintiffs and
defendants, concerns the power relationship between the forum and the
defendant, and raises sovereignty issues between the United States and
foreign states. Courts traditionally have discussed these issues as part of
personal jurisdiction.161 Some foreign courts, as will be discussed later, view
them—maybe even more fittingly—as an issue of a domestic court’s
“international competence” to decide an international case.162 The question,
whether foreign corporations may be held liable for human rights abuses
under international law, which was at the center of discussion in Jesner,
however, is a substantive issue. It raises two questions: first, if a corporation
as a legal entity, as opposed to its human agents, can be liable for its
complicity in human rights abuses, and, second, how such a claim may be
enforced.163 For the purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS,
however, an allegation of a “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States” is sufficient.164 Hence, courts should only address this
question once jurisdiction over the case has been established, even if doing
159. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399 (stating that “[t]he question whether foreign
corporations are subject to liability under the ATS should be addressed; for, if there is no
liability for Arab Bank, the lengthy and costly litigation concerning whether corporate
contacts like those alleged here suffice to impose liability would be pointless”).
160. See id. at 1398 (“Modern ATS litigation has the potential to involve large groups of
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign corporations in the United States for alleged human rights
violations in other nations. . . . The extent and scope of this litigation in United States courts
have resulted in criticism here and abroad.”) (internal citations omitted).
161. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283 n.11 (2010) (defining
foreign-cubed cases as “actions in which ‘(1) foreign plaintiffs [are] suing (2)
a foreign [defendant] in an American court for violations of American . . . laws based on . . .
transactions in (3) foreign countries’” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d
167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008))).
162. See infra notes 208-214 & accompanying text.
163. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between
“international norms” and “enforcement mechanisms” and arguing that per the Court’s
decision in Sosa, human rights qualify as international norms under the ATS while there is no
need for international consensus on how these norms are being enforced. Corporate liability,
Justice Sotomayor argues, is part of the enforcement mechanism, not the underlying
international norm, which “could be violated”).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1450.
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so leads to prolonged litigation, which, in fact, is due to shortcomings in
current personal jurisdiction rules, rather than the examination of a foreign
corporation’s ties to the United States in a given case.165
B. Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in
International Human Rights Cases
The Supreme Court addressed personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporate defendants in its decision inDaimler, as well as other—not human
rights related—recent decisions involving foreign corporate defendants
before U.S. courts, such as J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown.166 Against the
background of years of mostly broad but inconsistent practice in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions significantly restrict personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations—and foreign corporations,
specifically.167 However, despite the court having decided five personal
jurisdiction cases between 2011 and 2017 alone, important questions remain
unanswered and could affect plaintiffs’ ability to sue corporations for their
complicity in human rights violations before U.S. federal or state courts. The
following part examines how the Court’s latest restriction on both general
and specific personal jurisdiction would have affected the Jesner litigation if
personal jurisdiction had been raised. It then discusses how unresolved
jurisdictional questions may affect international human rights litigation
against corporate defendants and shows avenues for a more balanced and
harmonized approach.
165. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 154–56 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the majority’s comparative contacts test).
166. See generally J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (holding that
a state can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer because said manufacturer did
not engage in conduct purposefully directed at the state); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) and Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (demonstrating the trend
towards restricted personal jurisdiction, though these cases do not involve foreign corporate
defendants, but a domestic out-of-state corporation and an out-of-state individual
respectively).
167. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20 at 1248 (“In a series of cases decided between
2011 and 2017, the Supreme Court appeared to take steps toward gradually restricting
personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants in general—and foreign corporations
specifically.”); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test, 11
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (summarizing the 2011–2014 decisions).
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1. “At Home” General Jurisdiction
In Daimler, the Court addressed the question as to “whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preclude[d a California c]ourt
from exercising jurisdiction over [the German public corporation] Daimler .
. . given the absence of any California connection” to the charges alleged in
the complaint.168 In Daimler, plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler vicariously
liable for its Argentinian subsidiary of Mercedes-Benz for the latter’s actions
during the Argentine “Dirty War” period.169 Neither the subsidiary’s actions
took place in California, nor were the plaintiffs from California.170 Instead,
plaintiffs attempted to establish jurisdiction based on the contacts of
Daimler’s indirect subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), in
California.171 Hence, like Jesner, the case involved foreign plaintiffs suing
a foreign corporation before a U.S. federal court based on that corporation’s
subsidiary’s complicity in human rights violations suffered by non-resident
victims in a foreign country. Contrary to Jesner, the subsidiary involved
with the alleged human rights abuses itself was not situated in the forum state
and none of the actions giving raise to the suit took place in the forum.172
The Supreme Court in Daimler concluded that under a state’s long-arm
statute, a state court is allowed the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
party to the fullest extent possible so long as it is permissible under the
United States Constitution.173 Applying its precedent developed three years
earlier in Goodyear, the Supreme Court held that to exercise general
jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs in Daimler attempted to establish, not only
would the out-of-state defendant need to engage in continuous and
systematic activities in the forum state, but those activities would need to be
so substantial and of such nature as “to render them essentially at home in
the forum State.”174 It noted, for a corporation to be considered “at home” in
a jurisdiction, except for “exceptional case[s],”175 “the place of incorporation
168. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The potential for a foreign corporation to be held under a state court’s jurisdiction
due to the contacts of its subsidiary will be discussed in Part II(B)(2).
172. In Jesner, the U.S. subsidiary itself was complicit in human rights violations, while
in Daimler, only the Argentinean subsidiary was. The consequences of these factual
differences will be addressed later in Part II(B)(2). See infra, text accompanying note 184.
173. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125 (explaining that federal courts ordinarily follow state
law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over individuals).
174. Id. at 122 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011).
175. Id. at 139 n.19.
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and the principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general
jurisdiction.’”176 Since Daimler AG was neither incorporated nor did it have
its principal place of business in California, the Court concluded that
California courts lacked personal jurisdiction. Daimler was “an easy case”
as even the dissenting minority acknowledged that Daimler’s connection to
California was too weak to establish jurisdiction over the German parent.177
The Court did not provide much guidance on circumstances under which a
corporation might be at home in a jurisdiction outside the “paradigm
forums,” but “[did] not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional
case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such
a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.”178
In light of Jesner, the question arises whether a corporation’s in-state
subsidiary may suffice to render a foreign corporation “at home” in that state.
The Supreme Court, in Daimler, rejected the Ninth Circuit’s agency
approach to establishing general jurisdiction, calling it far too broad, as it
would “subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they
have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond
even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ . . . rejected in
Goodyear.”179 Jurisdiction over a foreign, parent corporation based on
human rights abuses committed by its in-state subsidiary are thereby
primarily a question of specific jurisdiction.
176. Id. at 137 (quoting Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 721, 735 (1988)).
177. See id. at 142 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (pointing to the “unique circumstances of
this case”).
178. Id. at 139 n.19. Compare Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448
(1952) (holding that an Ohio court could establish general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation because the State “was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of
business”), with Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416–18
(1984) (describing a Colombian company’s contacts with the forum State, which were limited
to “sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting
into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters,
equipment, and training services from [a Texas-based helicopter company] for substantial
sums; and sending personnel to [Texas] for training,” before stating that “mere purchases,
even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation in a cause of action not related to those
purchase transactions”).
179. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929).
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2. Agency Relationship Based Specific Jurisdiction
Since International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,180 for a court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant
must be engaged in “continuous and systematic” in-state activities that “also
give rise to the liabilities sued on.”181 Those activities can be performed not
only by the corporate defendant itself,182 but also by its authorized agent, as
long as they are of such nature as to justify subjecting the corporation to suit
in that state.183 Unlike in Daimler, the facts in Jesner raise the question of
specific jurisdiction based on such agency relationship, since contrary to
Daimler, Arab Bank’s New York branch performed activities in the forum
state, which were—at least somehow—connected to the suit.184 The
activities of Arab Bank’s New York branch satisfying the due process
criteria set forth in Int’l Shoe and its progeny is a factual question not
conclusively answered in Jesner.
Looking at relevant Supreme Court precedent, the criteria under which
the activities of a third party can be attributed to the principal are not entirely
clear. The Court in Int’l Shoe recognized that when commercial activities
are “carried on in behalf of” an out-of-state party, those activities may
sometimes be ascribed to the party.185 In Burger King it noted, “at least
where he [the out-of-state party] is a ‘primary participan[t]’ in the enterprise
and has acted purposefully in directing those activities.”186 Recently, in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, the Court stated that “‘[t]he
180. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
181. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; Cf. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8
(noting that adjudicatory authority where the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum” is specific jurisdiction).
182. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (stating that “although the commission of some single
or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability
on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon the state authority to enforce it . . .
other such acts, because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission,
may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit”) (internal citations omitted).
183. See id. at 319 (“[T]he criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot
be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been
suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its
agents in another state, is a little more or a little less.”) (internal citations omitted).
184. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135 n.13 (“Agency relationships, we have recognized, may
be relevant to the existence of specific jurisdiction. . . . It does not inevitably follow, however,
that similar reasoning applies to general jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted).
185. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
186. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 n.22 (1985) (citing Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 790 (1984)).
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requirements of International Shoe . . . must be met as to each defendant
over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.’”187 “[A] defendant’s
relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction.”188 Against this background, it seems unlikely that the Court
will allow the actions of a third party, including subsidiaries not completely
dominated by their out-of-state parent corporation, to transpose to the
defendant who has not purposefully availed itself to that forum.189 The latter,
in Jesner, seems questionable due to the automated and generic nature of the
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) allegedly used for
Arab Bank’s financial transactions through its New York branch.190 Given
the fact that CHIPS does not require human intervention and is used by other
major banks in the United States and internationally, Arab bank could have
relied on the services of any bank using CHIPS as an intermediary for its
dollar-denominated transactions.191 In this regard, Arab Bank neither
dominates its New York subsidiary nor are the subsidiaries’ transactions
indicative of “continuous and systematic” in-state activities. It is also
uncertain that Arab Bank played a dominant, if any, role in the branches’
alleged money laundering activities for the Texas-based charity affiliated
with Hamas.
Even if the branches’ actions could be attributed to the parent to
establish specific personal jurisdiction in this or similar cases, the question
still remains whether it were these activities that gave rise to the suit. This
raises the question, where, in human-rights related corporate liability cases,
the relevant actions took place. Two options are to be considered: (1) the
place where the corporate activity occurred, which—in case of a U.S.
corporation or a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation—could establish
jurisdiction before U.S. courts; or (2) the place where the plaintiff(s) suffered
the alleged human rights violations. The Supreme Court, thus far, did not
get a chance to decide on the issue. However, its recent focus on state
sovereignty rights and sufficient connections between the case and the forum
187. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) (citing
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)).
188. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014); see also Rush, 444 U.S. at 332 (stating
that “if a defendant has certain judicially cognizable ties with a State, a variety of factors
relating to the particular cause of action may be relevant to the determination whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice’”).
189. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1275 (speculating on the Court’s attitude
towards assigning contacts from a subsidiary to a parent for jurisdictional purposes).
190. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1395 (2018) (describing CHIPS).
191. Id.
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suggests that the Court would rather opt for the second option.192 As the
place where the plaintiffs suffered the alleged human rights violations is
often outside of the United States, the latter would typically deny foreign
plaintiffs’ access to U.S. courts due to a lack of specific jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on defendants’ rights is the result of far-
reaching long arm statutes and the constitutionalization of personal
jurisdiction in the post Int’l Shoe era.193 If limitations on personal
jurisdiction are predominantly conceived as an issue of a defendant’s due
process rights, it easily follows that defendant protection prevails over
plaintiffs’ need for effective access to a forum.194 But this is not a fatality.
The Court’s one-sided focus has been criticized, for example, by the minority
in the Supreme Court’s highly controversial McIntyre decision—an
international products liability case. Here, the minority proposed a more
nuanced and balanced approach to personal jurisdiction based on
reasonableness and fairness.195 It should be noted that precedent supports
taking into account the forum state’s and other parties’ interests in a
particular forum, as exemplified by Int’l Shoe’s reliance on “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”196 InMcGee, the Court expressly
invoked “highly realistic” factors such as an insurance policy holder’s
effective lack of redress if not allowed to sue the insurer at
home.197 In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court stated that “courts in
192. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.
873 (2011); see also Borchers, supra note 19, at 30 (“Recently, however, the Court has
evaluated contacts as if they are important for their own sake, while denying the relevance of
other considerations.”).
193. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20 (analyzing Daimler and pointing towards the
remaining differences between US and European rules); see also Borchers, supra note 19, at
34 (stating “[b]y dramatically pulling back the boundaries of constitutional regulation of
jurisdiction, states would be forced to draft meaningful long arm statutes”).
194. See Borchers, supra note 19, at 29–30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980)) (arguing “that the exclusive focus
on defendant contacts, without any exploration of any actual inconvenience to the defendant
and the need of plaintiff to have access to a forum, undercut the International Shoe rationale
of fairness and reasonableness”).
195. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 903 (Ginsburg, dissenting) (stating “[t]he modern approach
to jurisdiction over corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe,
gave prime place to reason and fairness”).
196. SeeWorld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.Woodson, 444U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“The essential inquiry in locating the constitutional limits on state-court
jurisdiction over absent defendants is whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction offends
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of
Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).
197. See Borchers, supra note 19, at 35 (“In McGee, the Court expressly invoked the
consideration that if unable to sue the insurer at home, the policyholder might be left without
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‘appropriate case[s]’ may evaluate . . . ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’ and the ‘shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.’”198 The availability of an effective forum, where plaintiffs will
actually be able to pursue their rights, frequently is an issue in international
human rights cases.199 The lack of judicial protection—typically in the
plaintiff’s home country, as this is usually where the human rights abuse
occurred—may thus justify specific personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations before U.S. courts in cases where corporate actions, which gave
rise to the suit, took place in the United States and no effective alternative
forum exists.200
III. FOREIGN CORPORATE DEFENDANTS IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The previous part has shown that, with regard to private human rights
litigation, U.S. jurisdictional rules to date are fragmented and deficient.
Additionally, with its restrictions on ATS jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in
Jesner specifically called upon the legislature to develop new rules.201
Hence, the statutory jurisdiction regime of the European Union might serve
as an example on how to reform the rules governing jurisdiction over foreign
corporate defendants in human rights related cases in the United States.
Because European rules, as opposed to U.S. case law, were created by the
European legislature, they are by their very nature less fragmented. They
also represent a compromise between the jurisdictional rules of individual
member states and underwent significant revisions prior to 2015, when the
current Brussels I bis Regulation, also called Brussels Regulation Recast,
entered into force.202 The regulation provides common rules on jurisdiction
any practical redress.” (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))).
198. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292).
199. See SKINNER, supra note 7 (examining obstacles and barriers that victims of human
rights abuse face in obtaining judicial remedies).
200. See also Borchers, supra note 19, at 36 (arguing that “the Court still has room to take
into account the plaintiff’s need for at least one reasonable forum. The J. McIntyre plurality
opinion is not controlling; the two-vote concurrence in the judgment is. Because the
concurrence did not adopt the sovereignty dogma of the plurality, it is not binding on lower
courts.”) (internal citations omitted).
201. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403 (“[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be
inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”).
202. Council Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
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and enforcement of judgements in international civil and commercial
disputes that are binding for courts in all EU member states.203 The
legislative history of the regulation shows that its drafters were aware of
increasing volume of private international human rights litigation and the
regulation recast, in part, responds to related jurisdictional problems.204 By
following at least part of the EU model, U.S. courts or legislators potentially
would not only create a more coherent system domestically, but also achieve
a more harmonized jurisdictional regime for victims of human rights abuses
to bring private claims internationally.205 New rules could better balance
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests, but they could also respect a state or
country’s interest in deciding, or have others refrain from deciding, private
human rights claims in which the country has a specific interest.206 The
following sections first give an overview of the European jurisdictional
regime before addressing those European norms that apply to private actions
by human rights victims against corporate defendants specifically.
A. The European Jurisdictional Regime
European jurisdictional rules are fundamentally different from U.S.
rules in both content and underlying rationale.207 It would be beyond the
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1–32 [hereinafter Council Regulation 1215/2012].
203. See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION (last visited Aug. 25,
2018), https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en [https://perma.cc/2HSV-EET
P] (depicting EU regulations are directly binding without additional domestic legislation,
while EU directives require local legislation in each member state).
204. See LUCASROORDA&CEDRICRYNGAERT, BUSINESS ANDHUMANRIGHTS LITIGATION
IN EUROPE: THE PROMISES HELD BY FORUM OF NECESSITY-BASED JURISDICTION 5 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019), https://unijuris.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/12/Business-and-
Human-Rights-Litigation-in-Europe.-The-Promises-Held-by-Forum-of-Necessity-based-
Jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7SE-4EHC] (noting the discussion of a “forum of
necessity clause” during the recasting process).
205. Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 141 (2001).
206. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (pointing, among
others, to the example of the government of South Africa, which “complained for six years
that an extraterritorial ATS case litigated in the Second Circuit interfered with the operation
of its post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission”) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez–
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
207. See generally Berger-Walliser, supra note 20 (analyzing Daimler and pointing
towards the remaining differences between US and European rules); see also Ralf Michaels,
Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1011 (2006) (suggesting “a
response to these challenges that builds on the work of both functional comparatists and
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scope of this article to analyze the European jurisdictional regime in detail,
but a brief overview is necessary to provide background for those rules that
apply specifically in the context of business and human rights, and which
will be examined in the next section.208
Most European countries have procedural rules that, like their counter
parts in the United States, determine subject-matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and venue. However, in addition to the three jurisdictional
issues mentioned before, European domestic courts, when deciding an
international case, will first determine if they have “international
competence.”209 International competence is commonly translated into
English as jurisdiction.210 As such, it is typically compared to personal
jurisdiction in the United States.211 However, strictly speaking, international
competence (or jurisdiction for this matter) has a very different function
compared to both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction in the United
States.212 While personal jurisdiction in the United States is conceptualized
as an issue of constitutional due process, rules of international competence
in the European Union seek to determine which country’s courts are best
suited to decide an international case.213 This explains why the jurisdiction
students of culture, but provides a way to explain the persistence of differences that overcomes
the limits of both: legal paradigms”).
208. Scholarship has described the European regime at the occasion of the Brussels
Regulation recast and has compared it to U.S. law in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in McIntyre and Daimler; see, e.g., SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE EXTERNAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE,
IN DER EUROPÄISCHE GERICHTSVERBUND-DIE INTERNATIONALEN DIMENSIONEN DES
EUROPÄISCHEN VERFAHRENSRECHTS 6 (Burkhard Hess, ed., 2017) (attempting “to shed light
on the underlying interests with which Europeans on the one hand and Americans on the other
are likely to approach treaty negotiations” in transactional litigation); Berger-Walliser, supra
note 20; Kate Bonacorsi, Not at Home with “At-Home” Jurisdiction, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1821 (2014); Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: Missed
Opportunities in Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union
Brussels I Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L &COMP. L. 1 (2014).
209. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1252 (“International competence deals with
the distribution of judicial power between sovereign countries, while the territorial allocation
of a case to a court in Berlin or Munich—though these two cities are located in different
German federal states (Länder)—is a question of venue (örtliche Zuständigkeit).”).
210. See, e.g., different language versions of Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note
202 (exhibiting how the regulation’s title translates literally from German or French as
“Regulation . . . on judicial competence,” while the official English translation reads
“Regulation . . . on jurisdiction”).
211. Michaels, supra note 207.
212. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1252 (stating “[u]nlike rules of personal
jurisdiction in the United States, international competence determines jurisdiction exclusively
in the international context”).
213. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1253 (comparing this function to that typically
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rules provided in the Brussels Regulation take a more balanced approach to
the defendant and plaintiff’s interest,214 but—in the interest of efficiency—
equally provide jurisdictional rules which “facilitate the sound
administration of justice,” sometimes at the detriment of one party.215
The Brussels Regulation provides a complete set of codified norms that
conclusively regulate personal jurisdiction in the EU member states in
private or commercial matters.216 This codification explains why, when
compared to U.S. personal jurisdiction, the European rules appear to be more
predictable than, for example, the “minimum contacts test.”217 It should be
noted, however, that some of the regulation’s rules are rather complex and
have led to extensive commentary and/or case law by the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”). The European rules are thus not necessarily as predictable
as a cursory reading of the Brussels Regulation may suggest.218 In addition
to common jurisdictional rules, the regulation provides that a judgement
issued in an EU Member State shall be recognized in another Member State
without any special recognition procedure.219
The Brussels Regulation applies whenever the defendant is domiciled
in a member state of the EU.220 This means that it does not only regulate
jurisdiction in disputes between parties domiciled within the EU, but also
disputes between a non-EU plaintiff and a defendant domiciled in an EU
member state.221 Disputes between an EU plaintiff and a defendant outside
attributed to choice of law rules); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutionalizing German
Jurisdictional Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 521 (stating that the United States is unique in
constitutionalizing personal jurisdiction).
214. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1296 (“The Regulation focuses on the
relationship between the court and the claim in order to find the most appropriate forum.”).
215. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at 9 (“[T]here should be
alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or
in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice.”).
216. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 1 and 4 (illustrating the
scope and jurisdiction of the Council Regulation).
217. See Michaels, supra note 207, at 1008, 1039–52 (“European law . . .
uses hard and fast rules that are easier to apply and therefore more predictable.”).
218. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1295–96 (citing to Council Regulation, art. 7
as an example of a complex special jurisdiction rule).
219. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 36(1) (“Under no
circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.”).
220. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 4(1) (“If the defendant is
not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall,
subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that Member State.”).
221. Council Regulation 1215/2015, supra note 202, at art. 4(1); see also Council
Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at pmbl. 13 (“In relation to insurance, consumer
contracts and employment, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more
favourable to his interests than the general rules provide for.”).
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of the EU, however, are not covered by the regulation’s sphere of
application. The extension of the Brussels Regulation’s jurisdictional rules
to third countries was one of the most contentious issues during the recast,
but ultimately was not retained.222 Thus, in cases between an EU plaintiff
and a non-EU defendant, the national court continues to apply its domestic
rules of jurisdiction.223 Because they represent a harmonized system, the
following section concentrates on the Brussels Regulation’s jurisdiction
rules and analyzes how they apply to human rights abuse victim’s claims
against corporate defendants domiciled in the EU.
B. Brussels Regulation and Human Rights
The Brussels regulation, similar to settled personal jurisdiction rules in
the United States, distinguishes between general and, what the regulation
calls, special jurisdiction.
1. General Jurisdiction
According to Article 4(1) of the Brussels Regulation, which by virtue
of Article 63(1) also applies to corporations,224 “persons domiciled in a
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that
Member State.”225 This broad jurisdictional norm is reminiscent of the
Supreme Court’s “at home” test.226 Neither the plaintiff needs to be
222. See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 208, at 37–38 (noting that the proposal to extend
Council Regulation, art. 6(2), though it ultimately was not retained, “garner[ed] considerable
interest in the United States”); see also Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2010) 748 final (Dec.
14, 2010) (deciding not to include the extension of the Brussels’ Regulations to third parties).
223. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at pmbl. 14 (“The autonomy of
the parties to a contract, other than an insurance, consumer or employment contract, where
only limited autonomy to determine the courts having jurisdiction is allowed, must be
respected subject to the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction laid down in this Regulation.”); see
also Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 6 (outlining where a person
domiciled in a Member State may sue).
224. See Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 63(1) (“A company or
other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it
has its: (a) statutory seat; (b) central administration; or (c) principal place of business.”).
225. Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 4(1).
226. See Goodyear Dunlap Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (“A court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State” (citing Int’l Shoe
Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945))).
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domiciled in the EU, nor does the case need to represent a close connection
to the territory of an EU member state as long as the defendant is domiciled
in the forum state.227 This has led some European commentators to assume
that, according to Brussels Regulation Article 4(1), any EU-basedMNCmay
be sued for its involvement with human rights abuses before the courts in its
home country, even if the latter were committed in a third country.228 Others
have taken a more careful stance, arguing that due to extraterritoriality and
sovereignty concerns, home-state jurisdiction in the EU should be limited to
cases where the tortious act or negligence can be situated in the home state.229
In fact, all European human rights cases against corporate defendants so far
have been based on direct foreign liability, that is, violation of proper
surveillance or other duties on the part of the parent company at their
European headquarters, rather than vicarious liability for human rights
violations committed by a corporation’s employee or subsidiary abroad.230
General jurisdiction based on Article 4(1) will only lead to jurisdiction
if the company is being sued before the courts in its home state. There have
been attempts to use Article 63(1) to attribute general jurisdiction over an
EU subsidiary to the non-EU parent and the other way around. Under the
Brussels Regulation, a corporation’s principal place of business is where the
main business activities are located.231 According to a decision by the ECJ,
227. See Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human
Rights Abuses in the European Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 939, 945 (2009) (“This is also the interpretation of the European Parliament, which,
in 2002, drew ‘attention to the fact that the 1968 Brussels Convention [as consolidated in the
Brussels Regulation] enables jurisdiction within the courts of Member States for cases against
companies registered or domiciled in the E.U. in respect of damage sustained in third
countries.’” (citing Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility, at 50, COM (2001) 366 final (May 30, 2002))).
228. Ingrid Heinlein, Zivilrechtliche Verantwortung transnationaler Unternehmen für
sichere und gesunde Arbeitsbedingungen in den Betrieben ihrer Lieferanten, NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT 276, 278 (2018) (Ger.); Marc-Philippe Weller, Luca Kaller
& Alix Schulz, Haftung deutscher Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen im
Ausland, 216 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 387, 391 (2016) (Ger.).
229. SeeWouters & Ryngaert, supra note 227, at 954–55 (“Courts should weigh, on the
one hand, the duty of home states to see to it that their TNCs behave correctly in host
states and, on the other hand, home states’ duty not to interfere in the economic policies of
host states.”) (internal citations omitted).
230. SeeWouters & Ryngaert, supra note 227, at 951 (“This is arguably so because in the
former situation the violation (of the duty of care) occurred in Europe, while in the latter case
it occurred abroad.”).
231. See Notice of Proposed Amendment No 09/2005, Draft Opinion of the European
Aviation Safety Agency, at 5 (Dec. 6, 2005), https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/df
u/NPA-09-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WH9-BQFL] (noting that “it is a general
understanding that the concept of principal place of business should be construed to mean a
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a branch, agency, or other dependent establishment do not qualify as a
corporation’s domicile under Article 63.232 Article 63(1) does not permit
“piercing the jurisdictional veil” to establish general jurisdiction over the
parent via its dependent branch in an EU member state.233
In contrast, U.S. human rights litigation against parent companies has
often focused on the agency relationship between parent and subsidiary, both
as a matter of substantive and procedural law.234 Compared to Brussels
Regulation Article 63(1), which clearly enumerates under which
circumstances a corporation can be sued in its home jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court’s “at home” test for general jurisdiction is less specific and,
in this regard, offers more room for interpretation.235 Considering this, it
seems possible for a court in the United States to establish general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign parent based on the latter’s in-state subsidiary, if,
for example, decision-makers in both companies were identical or the parent
in fact controlled the legally independent subsidiary.236
In the EU, it is an open question whether it is possible to interpret
Article 63(1) to locate the domicile of the (non-European) subsidiary of an
EU parent company in the EU, and thus to establish general jurisdiction over
the non-EU subsidiary, based on Brussels Regulation Article 4(1). Plaintiffs
in a case before U.K. courts claimed that the “central administration” of a
South African subsidiary of an U.K. company was in the U.K. and thus in
the European Union, because “the real decisions were taken in the U.K.,
permanent and regular place of transacting of general business and would not include a
temporary place of sojourn during ad hoc negotiations. It should as well indicate where is the
seat of the management of the interests of the organization or its guiding activity.”).
232. Case 33/78, Somafur SA v. Saar-Ferngas, 1978 E.C.R. 2183–93.
233. That follows from art. 7 (5). Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art.
63(1); see also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive
Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14, 10, 25
(1986) (noting that merging a parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an
inquiry “comparable to the corporate law question of piercing the corporate veil”).
234. Wouters & Ryngaert, supra note 227, at 951 n.46 (citing JENNIFER ZERK,
MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 223–25 (2006)).
235. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reconciling Transnational Jurisdiction: A
Comparative Approach to Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in US
Courts, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1243, 1293 (2018) (“Though the Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s agency approach to establishing general jurisdiction in Daimler, it did not expressly
exclude other ways of establishing derivative jurisdiction over the foreign parent through an
independent subsidiary in the forum state.”) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
135 (2014)).
236. The issue was raised in Daimler, but ultimately not decided, because plaintiffs never
“maintained that MBUSA was an alter ego of Daimler.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 134 (2014).
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where the parent company . . . had its seat.”237 Article 6(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),238 which guarantees a right of access
to a court, could support this broad interpretation.239 On the other hand,
predictability and efficiency, two other objectives of the Brussels
Regulation, may speak against it.240
Hence, under the Brussels Regulation, derivative jurisdiction is an issue
of specific rather than general jurisdiction. Most cases in the relatively
recent history of European human rights litigation against corporate
defendants have been brought against the European parent companies in their
home countries under Article 4(1). Accordingly, the following examination
of the Brussels Regulation’s special jurisdiction rules will analyze
scholarship and ECJ decisions in other areas and speculate how they might
apply to cases where plaintiffs attempt to sue non-EU companies before
private courts in an EU member state.
2. Derivative Special Jurisdiction based on a Subsidiary’s Domicile
Article 7(5) of the Brussels Regulation stipulates that “a dispute arising
out of the operations of a branch, agency[,] or other establishment” can be
brought “in the courts for the place where the branch, agency[,] or other
237. Marta Requejo Isidro, Business and Human Rights Abuses: Claiming Compensation
under the Brussels I Recast, 10 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 72 (2016) (referencing
the ultimately unsuccessful UK case, Vava and others v. Anglo American South Africa
Limited, [2013] EWHC (QB) 2131).
238. See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (providing fundamental freedom and human rights
protections submitted by the Council of Europe).
239. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1287 (stating that “the right to a fair trial
‘requires that litigants should have an effective judicial remedy enabling them to assert their
civil rights’” (quoting EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (Dec. 31, 2017))); see also Requejo Isidro,
supra note 237, at 78 (referring to an ECJ decision, where the court had acknowledged the
need to extend Art. 4(1) “to cases of unknown domicile of the defendant, provided that ‘no
firm evidence’ of a domicile outside of the EU has been adduced” (citing Case C-327/10
(2011); Case C-2929/10 (2012)).
240. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1296 (pointing to examples of special heads
of jurisdiction in the Brussels Regulation, which above all aim at improving “efficiency of
court proceedings”); see also Requejo Isidro, supra note 237, at 80 (noting that “it is worth
stressing that the assessment of jurisdiction is an early procedural step that ought not lead to
extended legal argument, cost and time) (citing Case C-327/10, para. 42). It should be noted
that the drafters of the Brussels Regulation did not retain a proposal for forum necessitatis in
the final version of the regulation, hence it is questionable if there is room for such an
approach within the strict system of the regulation; contra Requejo Isidro, supra note 237, at
81 (arguing that the ECJ’s case C-327/10, para. 45, might point in this direction).
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establishment is situated.”241 If a sufficient nexus between the parent and the
acting entity in question has been established as to qualify as a “branch,
agency[,] or establishment” under Article 7(5), the plaintiff will be able to
sue the foreign parent corporation in the forum where he or she was harmed
by the subsidiary’s operations. Article 7(5) would allow plaintiffs to sue, for
example, a Spanish parent company with a dependent subsidiary in France
if this was where the plaintiff was harmed.242 In this regard, Article 7(1) is
of limited use in international human rights cases, where the abuse typically
is committed by a foreign subsidiary outside of the EU.243
However, individual EU member states have similar provisions as part
of their domestic civil procedure law, which, in cases against non-EU
defendants replace the Brussels Regulation for a domestic court to determine
its international competence to decide an international case. Section 21(1)
of the German Code of Civil Procedure, for example, provides that a parent
company can be sued at the place where its branch or subsidiary is located.244
For that to be possible, the subsidiary needs to have a certain degree of
independence that lacks, for example, in the case of a simple contact office,
warehouse, or exposition stand, but would be given in the case of a bank
branch like Arab Bank’s New York branch.245 It does not follow, however,
that based on section 21(1) German courts would necessarily grant
jurisdiction over Arab bank if a similar case had presented itself before a
German court. For section 21(1) to establish jurisdiction over the foreign
parent corporation, there also needs to be a connection between the claim
and the activities of the branch.246 Though, arguably, in Jesner, there has
been some activity related to the claim performed by the New York branch
in the forum state—alleged CHIP transactions as well as money laundering
activities for the Texas-based charity—plaintiffs, as the United States
241. Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 7(5).
242. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 63 (“While Article 7(5) only applies to
corporate defendants domiciled in an EU member state, it was modeled after similar
provisions in the domestic civil procedure law of its member states. As a result, a US
company that is sued in an EU member state based on the activities of its European branch or
subsidiary is likely to be exposed to similar jurisdiction rules.”) (internal citations omitted).
243. Council Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 4(1) determines, at the same
time, general personal jurisdiction and the regulation’s sphere of application.
244. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], TITLE 2, § 21, https:
//www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ [https://perma.cc/8ATX-M5VL] (proving that a parent
company may be sued at the location of its subsidiary or branch).
245. See Reinhard Patzina, in 1 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG
243 (Wolfgang Krüger & Thomas Rauscher eds., 2016) (Ger.) (referencing BGH WM 1987,
1089, 1090).
246. See id. at 244 (noting that contracts concluded by the subsidiary in the forum state
and torts committed by the subsidiary establish a sufficient connection).
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Supreme Court argued in Jesner, were harmed outside of the forum state.247
If this, in light of extraterritoriality concerns in international human rights
cases, is enough to establish a sufficient connection under section 21(1), it is
equally questionable as to establish general jurisdiction under Brussels
Regulation Article 4(1) in cases where victims were harmed in a third
country.248 Since the only human rights case presented before a German
court so far was based on a negligence claim against the German parent
company rather than an agency relationship with its subsidiary, the issue has
not yet been decided in German jurisprudence.249
3. Special Tort Jurisdiction
Since most European substantive claims have been based on direct
liability, special jurisdiction over either the subsidiary, the parent, or both, at
the place where the tort has been committed seems like an obvious choice.
In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has limited specific
jurisdiction over a foreign parent company in cases where “the defendant’s
activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”250 In
Walden it required the “defendant himself” to have created “the necessary
contacts with the forum.”251 Hence, the question is whether the Brussels
Regulation takes a position more favorable to human rights
victims/plaintiffs. The regulation provides in Article 7 that “[a] person
domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: . . . (2)
in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place
where the harmful event occurred or may occur.”252
Hence, the availability of a domestic court in an EU member state to
judge human rights abuses committed in third countries largely depends on
how “the place where the harmful event occurred” is determined. This
247. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (2018) (noting that “petitioners
are foreign nationals seeking millions of dollars in damages . . . for injuries suffered in attacks
by foreign terrorists in the Middle East”).
248. See supra Part III(B)(1).
249. See Burkhard Hess & Martina Mantovani, Current Developments in Forum Access:
Comments on Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens, n.148 (Max Planck Inst. Lux. for
Procedural L., Research Paper Series No. 2019(1), 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper
s.cfm?abstract_id=3325711 [https://perma.cc/BP6G-4DVY] (discussing the Kik case that is
pending before Landgericht of Dortmund in Germany).
250. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011).
251. Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reconciling Transnational Jurisdiction: A Comparative
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in US Courts, 51
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1243, 1293 (2018) (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284
(2014)) (internal citations omitted).
252. Council Regulation, 1215/2012, supra note 202, at art. 7(2).
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criterion, in European commentary and ECJ case law, has been interpreted
broadly as both the place where the damage occurred and the place where
the harmful event giving rise to the damage occurred.253 The damage
typically occurs at the place where the event, which gives rise to the dispute,
produces and inflicts its harmful effects on the victim—as, for example, the
terror attacks in Israel that Arab Bank allegedly supported through its
financial transactions.254 Since in the human rights cases in question, the
damage usually occurs in a third country, only the second alternative—if
any—could lead courts in an EU member state to acknowledge jurisdiction
under Article 7(2).
Generally, the harmful event relates to the tortfeasor’s conduct or
activities.255 This means that in a human rights case brought against a foreign
corporation before a domestic court in an EU member state, one would need
to localize the harmful event giving rise to the damage in that country. This,
at first sight, seems easy to accomplish. If the activities of the defendant in
the EU, for example financial transactions, contributed to human rights
abuses in the plaintiff’s home state, jurisdiction in the EU based on the place
where the harmful event occurred seems to be established. A closer analysis,
however, raises the question of whether any causal relationship between the
activities or, in the case of negligence, the omission, suffices to establish
jurisdiction under Article 7(2). The majority in Jesner found Arab Bank’s
activities in New York inconsequential compared to the terrorist attacks in
Israel.256 According to the prevailing opinion in European scholarship and
some isolated court decisions on the matter, “any relevant activity matters if
the tortious conduct consists of a majority of elements.”257 “[M]ere acts of
preparation,” however, “are not covered.”258 What qualifies as “mere acts of
preparation” is less clear. The ECJ, in cases concerning trademark
infringement on the Internet through keyword advertisement found that
“[t]he event giving rise to a possible infringement of trade mark law . . . lies
in the actions of the advertiser using the referencing service for its own
253. See Berger-Walliser, supra note 20, at 1297–98 (“If these places are located in
different member states, the plaintiff has the privilege of choice.”) (citing Case 21/76,
Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA, 1976 E.C.R. 1747).
254. See Peter Mankowski, Article 7, in 1 EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 121, 202 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski, eds., 2016)
(explaining that, “[i]n principle, the place of the damage connotes the place where the physical
damage is done”) (internal citations omitted).
255. Id. at 281.
256. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1391 (2018) (referring to the alleged
activities performed on U.S. territory as a “relatively minor connection”).
257. Mankowski, supra note 254, at 281 (internal citations omitted).
258. Id. at 283.
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commercial communications,” not the technical service of the provider.259
One European commentator has suggested to ask whether “the law of the
state where the activity in question can be located . . . regards such activity
already to be a tortious activity.”260 This approach admittedly is complicated
because it requires substantive considerations already at the jurisdictional
stage.261 However, it has the merit of creating synergies between jurisdiction
and the ultimately applicable law to the case. Thus, it would prevent a court
from hearing a case if there is no prospect for an underlying substantive
claim.262 Given the substantial differences in how courts worldwide
currently treat corporate liability for human rights, the alignment of
procedural and substantive law might be a promising solution for private
human rights litigation. Though it does not necessarily extend victims’
access to courts, it avoids protection gaps and unnecessary lawsuits with no
prospect of success through the synchronization of jurisdictional and
substantive law.
If one were to apply this approach to the facts underlying the Jesner
litigation and under the hypothesis that the case happened in an EU member
state, the plaintiff would need to show that (1) Arab Bank performed
activities in that EU member state; (2) these activates ultimately caused
harm; and (3) these activities are considered tortious by the law applicable
to the case. While the outcome largely depends on factual questions, it
should be noted that Article 7(2) does not allow imputing third parties’ (here
Arab Bank branch’s) activities to the parent corporation. The latter would
be a case of Brussels Regulation Article 7(5). Hence, the parent’s activities
themselves need to qualify as tortious activity according to the
aforementioned definition and need to have been performed in the forum
state. Based on the facts in Jesner, it is questionable if the parent’s
involvement with the branch’s financial transactions would suffice. One
could argue that they were initiated by the parent and that it is the parent
company who actually made the decisions. However, these decisions were
likely made at Arab Bank’s headquarters and thus not in the forum state.
With regard to the dollar clearances using the CHIP system, which actually
259. ECJ Case C-523/10, para. 35 citing Google France and Google, paragraphs 52
and 58.
260. Mankowski, supra note 254, at 283.
261. However, this approach is not unusual. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1215/2012,
supra note 202, at art. 7(1)(b) (stating jurisdiction in matters relating to contracts for the sale
of goods refers to “the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were
delivered or should have been delivered”).
262. SeeMankowski, supra note 254, at 283 (arguing that “it is for the law at the place of
activity to decide whether and to which extend it is willing to protect which values and how
low or how high it sets the threshold”).
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occurred in the forum state, one could argue that these mechanical
transactions were not tortious in themselves and thus—similar to an Internet
provider’s uploading activities—mere preparatory acts. In conclusion, the
facts in Jesner probably would have led a court in an EU member state to
deny jurisdiction over Arab Bank based on Article 7(2), however, under a
different fact scenario, Article 7(2) could create jurisdiction in an EU
member state over an alien parent for its involvement in human rights abuses
in a third country.
4. Special Jurisdiction for Connected Claims
Finally, the Brussels Regulation, in Article 8(1), as well as some
member states’ domestic counterparts, provide a special head of jurisdiction
for connected claims. It has been used, for example, in a Dutch case to
establish jurisdiction over a Nigerian subsidiary at the domicile of the parent
company in the Netherlands based on the relationship of the claim against
the latter. The Dutch court even continued to hear the case against the
Nigerian subsidiary after it dismissed the claim against the Dutch parent.263
The underlying rationale of Article 8(1) is based on efficiency
considerations. Connected claims may be brought before a single court if
they are “so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgements resulting from
separate proceedings.”264 In the context of private human rights claims, it
has been suggested that the meaning of “related claims” be determined more
explicitly according to a proposal made by the International Law
Association’s Committee on Civil Litigation & the Interests of the Public.265
The Committee’s final report suggests a definition of connected claims
“based on the efficiency of hearing them together and on the defendants
being related.”266 According to the committee’s proposal, to be related (a)
the defendants need to be part of the same corporate group; (b) one defendant
needs to have controlled the other defendant; (c) one defendant directed the
litigious acts of the other defendant; or they took part in a concerted manner
263. SeeRequejo Isidro, supra note 237, at 81–82 (hearing the claim against the subsidiary
after the claim was dismissed against the parent).
264. See Horatia Muir Watt, Article 8, in 1 EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski, eds., 2016) (citing Case
189/87, 1988 ECR 5565) (holding that clearly connected claims can be brought before a single
court).
265. See Requejo Isidro, supra note 237, at 82–83 (referencing the International Law
Association, Committee on Civil Litigation & the Interests of the Public, Final Report on the
Subject of International Civil Litigation for Human Rights Violations, Sofia, 2012).
266. Requejo Isidro, supra note 237, at 83.
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in the activity giving rise to the suit.267 Whether specific jurisdiction based
on related claims constitutes a viable option for proceedings before U.S.
courts is questionable due to constitutional due process concerns, which
typically lead courts to favor defendant protection over efficiency
considerations.268
CONCLUSION
With the door closing on ATS litigation for corporate human rights
abuses in the United States, foreign plaintiffs will have to look not only for
new ways to substantiate their claims, but also for alternative jurisdictional
grounds to enforce their rights. These are likely to be limited by
constitutional due process considerations. Following the Court’s decision in
Daimler, courts will continue to have general personal jurisdiction over
corporations in their home state, but extraterritoriality concerns could even
limit general jurisdiction in cases where the harmful event took place outside
the United States.
Against the background of recent Supreme Court decisions, suing a
foreign-headquartered MNC in the United States will most likely prove even
more difficult. However, the above analysis has shown that space remains
for a more plaintiff-friendly interpretation of the Court’s special jurisdiction
rules. For guidance, this Article has looked at European jurisdictional rules
and court practice outside the ATS, which, after all, has always been a U.S.
exception criticized by foreign governments. Though domestic courts in EU
member states have a shorter tradition of corporate human rights litigation
than federal courts in the United States, against the background of the
advancement of the business and human rights agenda, recent trends for a
more active role of European courts to enforce human rights against
corporations have emerged. Most European private human rights litigation
has been brought against European companies in their home states based on
direct foreign liability claims. This trend is likely to increase based on the
due diligence regulation enacted in some European countries. Unlike
existing or proposed U.S. corporate reporting provisions on corporate human
rights impact, these laws place substantive monitoring duties on European
267. See Requejo Isidro, supra note 237, at 83 (citing Guideline 2.2(2) and (3)).
268. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reconciling Transnational Jurisdiction: A
Comparative Approach to Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in US
Courts, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1243, 1303 (2018) (concluding that “[w]here the U.S.
Supreme Court protects defendants’ due process rights and the sovereignty of US states, the
Brussels Regulation strives for harmonization of jurisdictional rules between member states
and access to justice for the plaintiff.”).
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companies and could inspire reforms in U.S. federal or state law. Moreover,
European jurisdictional rules offer possibilities for foreign plaintiffs to sue
even non-EU MNCs before European domestic courts. These rules could
potentially be transposed to the United States context, despite fundamental
differences in U.S. and EU jurisdiction law and the narrow circumstances in
which these rules apply. Especially in connection with the rise of the
substantial due diligence obligation mentioned, a jurisdictional rule that
relies on the place where the harmful event giving rise to the damage
occurred does not only protect plaintiffs’ access to justice rights, but also
could bring jurisdictional rules in line with the “lex loci delicti” rule
traditionally used to determine the applicable law of an international tort
case. Doing so would prevent courts from having to apply a different law
than their own to the case, which, in turn, would promote legal certainty and
efficiency. It also would make personal jurisdiction consistent with federal
venue rules.269 In international human rights litigation, the lack of effective
protection in a plaintiff’s home country may justify this type of specific
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in cases where corporate
actions, which gave rise to the suit, took place in the forum state, and no
effective alternative forum exists in the plaintiff’s home country.
While the academic discussion on private human rights litigation has
primarily focused on substantive claims, this Article has underscored the
importance of jurisdictional rules as part of an effective enforcement
mechanism for human rights. In light of the recent changes on both sides of
the Atlantic, now might be a good time for courts and regulators to develop
a coherent legal regime to hold corporations accountable for their
involvement in international human rights abuses, which embraces both
substantive and procedural rules. More balanced and predictable rules would
not only improve plaintiffs’ rights, but also provide guidance to MNCs who
continue to be reluctant to adopt human rights as part of their Corporate
Social Responsibility. Finally, the UN Guiding Principles call on states to
provide access to a remedy as part of their third pillar. Thus, they suggest
facilitating court access for human rights victims rather than restricting it.
269. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 899 (2011) (pointing towards
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b) and noting “in federal-court suits, whether resting on diversity or
federal-question jurisdiction, venue is proper in the judicial district ‘in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred’”).
